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Abstract
We study the informational channel of Önancial contagion in the laboratory. In
our experiment, two markets with privately informed subjects open sequentially.
Subjects in the second market observe the history of trades and prices in the Örst
market. Although in both markets private information is imperfectly aggregated,
subjects in the second market make correct inferences from the information coming
from the Örst market. As theory predicts, when fundamentals are correlated, conta-
gion occurs in the laboratory; in contrast, with independent fundamentals, there is
no contagion e§ect. In both cases, the correlation between asset prices is very close
to the theoretical one.
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in seminars in several institutions and to a co-editor and a referee for invaluable comments and
suggestions. We thank Teresa Steininger for outstanding research assistance. Guarino gratefully
acknowledges the Önancial support of the ERC, the ESRC and the INET. We are responsible for
any error. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System, or of
the Bank of Italy.
1 Introduction
Comovements among asset prices, whether across countries or across asset classes, are
often higher than what can be explained by comovements among asset fundamentals.
This empirical regularity, usually referred to as Önancial contagion, has been widely
documented in the empirical Önance and international Önance literatures.1 Indeed,
almost all the recent episodes of Önancial turmoil, from the Asian Önancial crisis of
1997 to the events of 2007-2008, suggest that Önancial asset prices are very highly
correlated, in excess of what can be expected by looking at fundamentals, and that
Önancial instability can quickly spread from one country to another, or from one
asset class to another.
The theoretical asset pricing literature has highlighted several mechanisms that
generate contagion in Önancial markets. In Calvo (2004), contagion arises from cor-
relation in liquidity shocks: agents, hit by a liquidity shock in one market, liquidate
their position across markets in order to meet a margin call (see also Yuan, 2005).
In Kyle and Xiong (2001), Önancial contagion is due to wealth e§ects. In Fostel
and Geanakoplos (2008), Önancial contagion arises as a result of the interplay be-
tween market incompleteness, agentsí heterogeneity, and margin requirements. In
Kodres and Pritsker (2002), contagion happens through cross-market rebalancing,
when traders hit by a shock in one market rebalance their portfolios. In Pavlova and
Rigobon (2007), contagion arises from wealth transfers and portfolio constraints.2
1See, among the many papers on the topic, Eichengreen et al. (1996), Edwards and Rigobon
(2002), and Ehrmann et al. (2011).
2While the studies just mentioned explain contagion across markets, others have focused on
contagion across Önancial institutions (see, e.g., the seminal contribution of Allen and Gale, 2000).
Cipriani et al. (2013) present an experimental test of the cross-market rebalancing channel; Trevino
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In their seminal paper, King and Wadhwani (1990) argued that Önancial conta-
gion can be explained by informational spillovers across markets. Price changes in
a market may be due to news about an idiosyncratic shock or about a systematic
shock a§ecting many markets at the same time. Traders in other markets attach
some probability to the event that the price movement is due to a systematic shock,
and, therefore, adjust their position in their own market even when, in fact, the shock
is idiosyncratic. Because of this informational spillover, the correlation among asset
prices is higher than that among fundamentals. The role of information spillovers in
generating Önancial contagion is also illustrated by Cipriani and Guarino (2008) in
a sequential trading model: they show that because of informational spillovers, herd
behavior and informational cascades transmit from one market to another.
The information channel is one of the most prominent channels of Önancial con-
tagion identiÖed by the theoretical literature (see, e.g., the surveys by Pericoli and
Sbracia, 2003; Allen and Gale, 2008; Knyazeva et al., 2012). It has an intuitive ap-
peal because it relies on a simple informational structure; namely, that asset prices
are a§ected by both idiosyncratic and systematic shocks.
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence in support of this mechanism is only circum-
stantial. King and Wadhwani (1990) showed that volatility increases in the London
Stock Exchange when Wall Street opens; moreover, they showed that cross-sectional
asset price correlation increases during a crisis. Other papers have looked at correla-
tion coe¢cients in crises versus tranquil times with similar results.3 As the authors
(2016) presents a coordination game of contagion among creditors solved through global games
tecniques and tests the model in the laboratory.
3The interpretation of an increase in correlation coe¢cient as contagion has been criticized by
Boyer et al. (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002). Their criticism, however, has been
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themselves acknowledge, however, this evidence is indirect, and contagion could stem
from di§erent mechanisms. The reason for the lack of strong empirical support is
that a direct test of the theory would require data on tradersí information, which is
of course di¢cult to obtain. More broadly, it is hard to understand whether there
is excess correlation with respect to the fundamentals since it is hard to control for
fundamentals.
The empirical relevance of the information channel can be questioned for two
opposite reasons. On the one hand, the theoretical mechanism proposed by King
and Wadhwani (1990) assumes that agents learn in a Bayesian fashion; whether
human beings are actually Bayesian, however, is at the centre of a large debate
both in experimental economics and psychology. To cite but one Önding of this vast
literature, a number of experimental papers suggest that people put more weight on
their private information than on the public one (see, e.g., Ziegelmeier et al., 2013).
If traders do not make inference from the other market in a Bayesian way, they could
simply not react (or at least underreact) to the information coming from the order
áow and the price changes in other markets, making the channel less relevant.
On the other hand, the empirical predictions of the informational channel are
based on the assumption that market participants do not engage in ìpanic sellingî
or ìirrational exuberance,î which is questioned by the behavioral Önance literature.
This is the concern of, among others, Knyazeva et al. (2012, p. 18): ìThe idea that
investors can infer an economyís prospects from crises in other economies is central
overcome by the use of asset pricing models in the estimation of cross-asset linkages (Bekaert et al.,
2005). De Bandt and Hartman (2000) provide an overview of the di§erent empirical approaches to
contagion.
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to the information contagion view [...]. [...] The caveat about investor rationality
applies here as well. The explanations above focused on rational investors. Often at
least some degree of irrationality is involved in investor panics. If investors overreact
to news or make other mistakes when drawing inference from other crises, contagion
can spread faster as a result of investor irrationality.î
In a nutshell, although informational contagion is one of the most oft-cited conta-
gion mechanisms, the (real-market) evidence about it is only circumstantial. More-
over, there are various reasons that the theoretical channel of contagion may either
not be present in real markets or, on the contrary, underestimate the importance of
cross-market spillovers.
Our work Ölls the gap between the theoretical and the empirical literature by
o§ering a direct test of the informational channel of King and Wadhwani (1990)
using experimental data. In a laboratory Önancial market, the experimenter directly
controls the information set available to subjects acting as traders, and can study the
e§ect of a piece of news regarding one market on other markets. In our experiment,
we extend the traditional experimental asset market design to a two-asset economy
with informational spillover across markets.
Whereas our aim is to test the informational channel of Önancial contagion, there
is an important aspect in which we depart from King and Wadhwani (1990). In
their work, King and Wadhwani (1990) assume that the price fully reáects an assetís
fundamental value, thereby disregarding how the market aggregates private infor-
mation. Whereas theoretically full revelation of information can be assumed, in an
empirical study it is important to test the extent to which it occurs. A large literature
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on experimental asset markets with asymmetrically informed traders (see, e.g., Plott
and Sunder, 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990) has already studied the empirical
validity of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium. The literature has found support
for the conclusion that experimental Önancial markets are able to aggregate private
information, albeit to di§erent degrees.4 In our paper we study how informational
spillovers across markets interact with information aggregation within each market.
As a theoretical counterpart to the experimental data, we Örst extend the orig-
inal setup of King and Wadhwani (1990) to an economy where agents have private
information.5 In the model, two markets open in sequence, and traders in the sec-
ond market observe the history of trades and prices in the Örst. In both markets,
traders receive private information about their own assetís fundamental value, which
is e¢ciently aggregated by the price. We contrast two parameterizations. In the
Örst parameterization, asset values are correlated, whereas in the second they are
independent. With correlated asset fundamentals, information coming from the Örst
market is relevant for the second and informational spillovers lead to informational
contagion. In contrast, with independent asset fundamentals, there is no contagion.
Based on these two parameterizations, we ran two experimental treatments, one
with correlated (Treatment I) and one with independent fundamentals (Treatment
II). In contrast to the existing literature on experimental asset markets with asym-
4Information aggregation has also been studied in sequential trade models (see, e.g., Cipriani
and Guarino, 2005, 2009; Drehmann et al., 2005, who test in the laboratory a Glosten and Milgrom,
1985 type of model). In those studies, however, the focus is on whether individual traders herd on
the decisions of others and not on informational spillovers across markets.
5Grossman (1976) is the Örst contribution to the study of Rational Expectations Equilibrium
with privately informed agents; Grossman (1978) extended the analysis to a multi-asset economy,
without explicitly studying Önancial contagion caused by informational spillovers across markets.
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metrically informed traders, in our experiment subjects have two sources of informa-
tion: i) a noisy private signal on the idiosyncratic shock to their own asset; ii) the
ability to observe what occurs in the market opening Örst, in which other subjects
are trading on the basis of their own private information. Notice that this is di§erent
from the case in which subjects observe a private and a public signal: in our experi-
ment, every subject makes his own judgement on how well other subjects use their
own private information and, as a result, how well the price in the market opening
Örst reáects the true asset value.6
The experimental data show that, in line with the previous literature, private
information is aggregated, but not completely in either market. Because the aggre-
gation of private information is not complete, Bayesian agents in the market opening
second would attach a lower weight to the (noisy) information coming from the mar-
ket opening Örst. If fundamentals are correlated, Önancial contagion, however, would
still occur as agents respond to the noisy signal coming from the Örst market.
Our results for Treatment I are in line with this theoretical argument. Subjects
correctly infer the value of the information contained by the trading activity in the
Örst market and use it to trade in the second market. As a result, there is Önancial
contagion across markets, with the correlation between asset prices higher than that
between their fundamentals. In fact, in the laboratory, the correlation between
asset prices is very close to that of the theoretical model (where full aggregation of
6Most experiments in the literature only study information aggregation in a one-asset econ-
omy. There are a few experimental papers in which trading in a multiple asset Önancial economy
is studied (e.g., in Plott and Sunder, 1988, some of the treatments have three securities traded
contemporaneously in an economy with three states of the worldóso that markets are complete),
but the focus remains on information aggregation, and the issue of informational spillovers across
markets is not studied.
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private information is assumed). Although surprising at a Örst glance, we will show
that this result comes from two facts: i) in the two markets, private information
is approximately aggregated to the same degree; ii) subjects attach (approximately)
the theoretically correct weight to the information coming from the Örst market (this
weight turns out to be the same in the Rational Expectations Equilibrium and taking
into account that information in the laboratory is noisy). Finally, in Treatment II,
with independent fundamentals, theory predicts that contagion does not occur. The
experimental data are consistent with the theoryís prediction.
Taken together, the results of the two treatments suggest that i) information con-
tagion is robust to the departures from equilibrium that human subjects inevitably
exhibit; ii) information contagion is not characterized by an excess (irrational) re-
action to news; instead, it is the outcome of correct inference from the information
received from the market opening Örst. These results complement the indirect evi-
dence collected from real-markets data that information contagion is an important
transmission mechanism of shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 illustrates the experiment. Section 4 explains the results.
Section 5 concludes. The Appendix (available online) contains the instructions of
the experiment and additional results.
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2 Theoretical framework
2.1 PRELIMINARIES: KING ANDWADHWANI (1990)íS
MODEL
The purpose of our paper is to test the informational contagion channel Örst proposed
by King and Wadhwani (1990) in a controlled laboratory environment. It is therefore
useful for us to explain how informational contagion arises in their model.
Let us consider a two-asset Önancial economy. In both markets, denoted by A and
B, the asset price change during a given time interval is a function of newly released
information. King and Wadhwani (1990) consider two types of information: i) sys-
tematic newsóa§ecting the fundamental values of both assets; and ii) idiosyncratic
news, speciÖc to each asset.
For simplicityís sake, consider the case in which the two markets open in sequence,
with market A opening Örst. Traders in market A receive news about their own
asset, and the price of asset A changes accordingly. When market B opens, traders
in market B observe the price change occurred in market A, but do not know whether
it is due to idiosyncratic or systematic news. As a result, the equilibrium price in
market B will change even when the price change in market A was due to purely
idiosyncratic reasons. The reason is that traders attach some probability to the event
that the price change in market A was due to news about the systematic component,
common to both assets.
In this economy, the correlation between asset prices in the two markets is higher
than what we would observe if traders knew whether a shock is idiosyncratic or
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systematic (fundamental correlation). King and Wadhwani label this phenomenon
ìinformational contagionî.7
2.2 THE MODEL
To test informational contagion in the laboratory, we develop a model that embeds
the main insights of King andWadhwani (1990) in a two asset-economy with privately
informed traders.
SpeciÖcally, we consider a two-market economy, in which the two markets, labeled
by A and B, open sequentially. In each market, a continuum of risk-neutral traders
trade one asset. The fundamental value of asset A (V A, which can be thought of
as the present discounted value of the assetís future stream of dividends) takes two
values, 0 or 100, with the same probability:
V A =
8><>: 0 with probability
1
2
,
100 with probability 1
2
.
Although the realization of V A is unknown to market participants, they have
private information about it; in particular, they receive a symmetric binary signal
with precision 0:75.8 In other words, each participant in market A receives a signal
sA distributed as follows: Pr(sA = 0jV A = 0) = Pr(sA = 100jV A = 100) = 0:75.
Market B opens after trading in market A ends. Traders in market B only trade
7King and Wadhwani (1990) contrast this contagion equilibrium, which they label ìpartially-
revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium,î with a ìfully-revealing Rational Expectations Equi-
libriumî (in which traders observe whether a shock is idiosyncratic or systemic, and although
information áows across markets, there is no contagion), and with a ìno-communication Rational
Expectations Equilibriumî (in which traders do not observe the price in the other market, and no
informational spillover occurs across markets).
8Obviously, any precision greater than 0:5 would deliver the same qualitative results.
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asset B. The fundamental value of asset B, V B, equals V A with probability p and
C with probability 1" p, where C is a random variable distributed as follows:
C =
8><>: 0 with probability
1
2
,
100 with probability 1
2
.
In other words, when V A = 0, then V B = 0 with probability p + (1 " p)1
2
and
V B = 100 with probability (1"p)1
2
; when V A = 100; then V B = 100 with probability
p+ (1" p)1
2
and V B = 0 with probability (1" p)1
2
.9
Traders in market B receive a symmetric binary signal sC on the realization of
C with precision 0:75, that is, Pr(sC = 0jC = 0) = Pr(sC = 100jC = 100) = 0:75.
Furthermore, traders in market B not only observe their own private information,
but also the price in market A.10
The perfectly competitive Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) price of as-
set A is 0 when V A = 0 and 100 when V A = 100; that of asset B depends both on
V A and on C. If both V A and C are 0 (or 100), then the price of asset B is 0 (or
100, respectively); if instead V A and C are di§erent, then the equilibrium price of B
9In King and Wadhwani (1990), the distribution of asset values is
V A = uA + $uB + vA;
V B = 'uA + uB + vB ;
where uA, uB , vA and vB are normal random variables and $ and ' are parameters; uA and uB
reáect systematic news and vA and vB idiosyncratic ones.
In our model, the distribution of asset values is di§erent. Nevertheless, we can interpret the
realization of V A as an idiosyncratic shock to market A with probability (1" p), and as a common
shock a§ecting both markets with probability p; and the realization of C as an idiosyncratic shock
to market B that may occur when the market is not hit by a common shock. Since our assumptions
imply that both asset values have the same support f0; 100g, their distribution is simple to explain
to subjects, which makes the model implementation in the laboratory easier.
10Note that, from a theoretical standpoint, in order for information contagion to occur, one would
not need to assume that market B has its own idiosyncratic shock (i.e., C would not need to be a
random variable), nor do traders in market B need to be privately informed. Our setup, however,
assures that trading activity in market B is not driven by the information coming from market A
only: This is in line with the situation in many actual markets, in which, presumably, traders use
information about their own market too.
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is V Ap+ C(1" p).11
In the literature, a standard deÖnition of contagion is correlation between prices
higher than correlation between fundamentals. This is natural, since contagion is
thought of as excess co-movement (that is, we observe higher co-movement among
prices than what can be explained by fundamentals, such as trade or Önancial link-
ages).
In King and Wadhwani (1990), contagion occurs because agents do not know
whether a change in the price of one market stems from an idiosyncratic or systematic
shock. In our set up, with probability p the realization of V A a§ects V B, whereas
with probability (1" p) it does not;12 in the Örst case, the shock to V A is systematic
(as it a§ects the fundamental values in both markets), whereas in the second case it
is idiosyncratic (and V B is determined by its own idiosyncratic component). Since
agents do not know whether the shock is systematic or idiosyncratic, learning is
incomplete.
SpeciÖcally, incomplete learning in Market B causes the variance of PB to be
lower than the variance of V B.13 However, because of informational spillovers, the
co-variance between prices does not decrease below that between fundamentals. As
11See Appendix A:1 for the derivation of the equilibrium in the case p = 0:5 (the parameter value
used in the laboratory). The REE equilibrium for di§erent levels of p can be found in a similar
way. The derivation of the REE with privately informed traders is conceptually similar to that of
Grossman (1976) for a single asset economy and Grossman (1978) for a multi-asset economy.
12To compare our set up with King and Wadhani (1990) we can think of the unconditional value
in both markets as being equal to 50 and interpret the realizations of V A and C as the shock (or
the arrival of news) in the market.
13In contrast, V ar(V A) = V ar(PA) since, to keep our setup simple, we assumed that there is
no uncertainty on whether the shock in market A a§ects market Aís fundamental. Our results on
excess correlation and contagion, however, are robust to allowing for incomplete learning also in
market A.
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a result, correlation between prices is higher than correlation between fundamen-
tals. In Appendix A:2, we show that, in the REE, the correlation between prices
is pp
(1!2p+2p2) , whereas the correlation between fundamentals is p; since
pp
(1!2p+2p2)
is greater than p, there is contagion from market A to market B. It is important
to note that this result does not stem from incomplete learning (i.e., the fact that
price variances are lower than fundamental variances). One can easily write a model
of incomplete learning with no uncertainty on the idiosyncratic or systematic na-
ture of the shock, in which both covariance and variances of prices are lower than
their fundamental counterparties, and the correlation between prices is equal to the
correlation between fundamentals.
3 The Experiment
REE models are silent on the mechanism through which agents trade in the economy
and equilibrium prices and allocations are reached. The standard practice in experi-
mental economics, which we follow in our experiment, is to test this class of models
in the laboratory through a continuous-time double auction. Because double auctions
mirror the trading mechanism of many exchanges, they allow the experimenter to
test a theoretical model in a setup that resembles a real Önancial market.14
We ran the experiment in the ELSE Experimental Laboratory at the Department
14Several trading mechanisms are used in real Önancial markets; some of them (such as a batch
auction) have also been implemented in the laboratory. However, double auctions have proven to
have good properties in terms of information and allocative e¢ciency (see, e.g., Smith et al., 1982;
Friedman, 1993; Cason and Friedman, 1999). They are used not only to test theoretical models
of asymmetric information (e.g., Plott and Sunder, 1982), but also standard asset pricing models
(e.g., Bossaerts et al., 2007).
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of Economics at UCL. Overall, we recruited 192 subjects (undergraduate students in
all disciplines) to conduct twelve sessions, six for each of two experimental treatments.
Subjects had no previous experience with this experiment and participated in one
session only.
3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In each session, 16 subjects traded in a two-market, computerized double auction.15
We ran two treatments. In the baseline treatment (Treatment I), the value of asset
B was equal to the value of asset A with probability 0:5 (i.e., p = 0:5); in this case,
Pr(V B = ijV A = i) = 0:75 > Pr(V B = i) for i = 0; 100, that is, asset fundamentals
were not independent. In the control treatment (Treatment II), the value of asset
B was set equal to the value of C (i.e., p = 0), and Pr(V B = ijV A = i) = 0:5 =
Pr(V B = i), that is, asset fundamentals were independent. Table 1 shows the REE
prices, PA and PB, in the two treatments.
Because in Treatment I asset fundamentals are not independent, informational
contagion arises in equilibrium: in the REE, the correlation between prices is 0:71,
higher than that between fundamentals (0:5). In contrast, in Treatment II, since
the two asset values are independent, informational contagion does not arise in
equilibriumóin the REE, the correlation between prices is 0, the same as that be-
tween fundamentals.
15A large number of experiments have shown that double auctions produce competitive allocations
and prices even with a small number of subjects (e.g., Smith 1962, 1964; Plott and Sunder, 1982,
1988).
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Table 1. The REE equilibria in the two treatments
Treatment I Treatment II
PA PB PA PB
V A = 0; C = 0 0 0 0 0
V A = 0; C = 100 0 50 0 100
V A = 100; C = 0 100 50 100 0
V A = 100; C = 100 100 100 100 100
Corr(PA; PB) 0:71 0
Corr(V A; V B) 0:5 0
3.2 PROCEDURES
In each of the 12 sessions of the experiment, we had 10 rounds of trading activity.
Each session was organized in the following way:
& Subjects were given written instructions (see Appendix H). Subjects could ask
clarifying questions, which we answered in private. After reading the instruc-
tions, subjects answered a short questionnaire to check their understanding
of the experiment. A subject giving the wrong answer was notiÖed that the
answer was wrong and was asked to answer again until he gave the correct
answer.
& We randomly assigned the 16 participants of each session to two groups of 8
subjects, group I and group II. A subject remained in the same group for the
entire experiment.
& In each round, market A and market B opened in sequence. In even rounds,
group I traded asset A; after trading in market A ended, group II traded asset
14
B. In odd rounds, group II traded asset A and group I asset B.
& In each market, subjects traded the asset by exchanging it among themselves
for 200 seconds. They used the trading platform shown in FigureH1, Appendix
H.
& While one group of subjects was trading, the other observed the history of
quotes and trades. Moreover, while one of the two groups traded in market A,
we asked the subjects in the other group to indicate their belief on the value of
asset A being 100 after 80, 140 and 190 seconds of trading activity. This helped
subjects to pay attention to the trading áow in the other market; additionally,
it provided us with information about how subjects interpreted the history of
trading in market A.
Let us now discuss the procedures for each round in detail. In each round, before
the start of trading activity in market A, the computer program drew the asset
value V A, which, with equal probability, was equal to 0 or 100 units of a Öctitious
experimental currency called lira.
At the beginning of the round, each participant received an endowment of 4 units
of asset A and 500 liras. Subjects also received information about the asset value
in the form of a symmetric binary signal with precision 0:75. SpeciÖcally, when the
asset value was 100, six participants observed a ìgreen ballî and two participants a
ìred ball;î if the value was equal to 0, six participants observed a ìred ballî and two
participants a ìgreen ball.î This signal structure guarantees that in each round the
private signals collectively reveal the fundamental V A even if the number of subjects
15
is Önite.16
During the 200 seconds of trading activity in market A, subjects could post
o§ers to sell or buy units of asset A. To post a sell o§er, a subject would click
on a sell button and enter the minimum price he was willing to accept. The o§er
appeared immediately on everyoneís screen, in a column labeled Current Sell O§ers
(the identity of the subject making the o§er was not revealed). Similarly, to post a
buy o§er, a subject would click on a buy button and enter the maximum price he was
willing to pay. A trade would automatically be executed by the computer whenever
the lowest sell price (ask) was lower than the highest buy price (bid). As a result,
if a subject wanted, for instance, to buy at the prevailing (i.e., the lowest) ask, he
could simply enter a price equal to or greater than that price, and the trade would
be immediately executed (at the outstanding price). If, instead, a subject input, for
example, an ask price higher than the outstanding ones, his ask would simply appear
among the Current Sell O§ers (where all asks were shown in increasing order).
Subjects could choose any buy or sell price greater than or equal to zero.17 For
each subject, the maximum number of outstanding sell o§ers allowed was equal to
the units of the asset held in his portfolio; and the sum of all the buy o§er prices
could not exceed the cash held in his portfolio. At any time, a subject could withdraw
outstanding buy or sell o§ers that had not already been executed.
A subjectís screen also displayed his current portfolio of cash and of units of the
asset, the list of past trades in the round (with his own executed trades highlighted),
16Other signal structures, even if informative, may not deliver the same result (for instance, i.i.d.
signals with precision 0:75).
17Also, a subject was not allowed to place a buy o§er higher than one of his outstanding sell
o§ers (in other words, a subject could not trade with himself).
16
all the outstanding bid and ask prices, and the time left before the end of the round
(see Figure H1).
After trading in market A ended, trading in the other market occurred accord-
ing to the same protocol. In particular, each participant in market B received an
endowment of 4 units of asset B and 500 liras. Subjects also received information
about the realization of the random variable C (which we labeled the ìB-coin,î in
the experiment) in the form of a symmetric binary signal with precision 0:75, exactly
as explained above for asset A. In the instructions for Treatment I, we explained
to subjects that the value of asset B was equal either to asset A or to the B-coin
with equal probability; and for Treatment II, we explained that the value of asset B
was equal to the B-coin. At the end of the round, the values of the two assets, V A
and V B, were revealed, and each subject saw a detailed summary of his per-round
payo§ on the screen. Each subjectís per-round payo§ was equal to the sum of the
cash and of the value of the assets in his portfolio. Additionally, we paid subjects
a transaction bonus of 5 liras for the Örst 5 trades. The bonus gave subjects an
incentive to exchange the asset in an environment in which payo§s and endowments
are the same.18 We limited the bonus to the Örst Öve trades to avoid the possibility
that subjects would keep exchanging the asset among themselves just to earn the
bonus.19
18Note that, in the economy we described in Section 2, there are no gains from trade and as
a result, agents do not have any incentive to trade at the REE price (no-trade theorem). Note
also that because of the bonus, the REE prices in either treatment are not unique, rather they are
intervals of 5 liras around the equilibrium predictions described in Section 3:1.
19As we will show in Section 4, the transaction bonus of 5 liras is large enough to give subjects
an incentive to trade in the laboratory.
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In each session, before we ran the actual experiment, we had a training phase to
familiarize subjects with the trading platform.20 The training phase consisted of 10
rounds of trading in only one market. Since the session was for training purposes
only, we do not report its results in the main text of the paper.21 It is important
to remark that, in the training sessions, subjects familiarized themselves with the
trading platform in a one-market economy; in contrast, the focus of our empirical
analysis is how, in the laboratory, subjects interpreted the history of prices and trades
in market A while trading in market B, something that they did not experience
during the training phase.
At the end of the experiment, we randomly selected three rounds and summed up
the per-round payo§s. We converted experimental liras into British Pounds at the
exchange rate of $1 = 100 liras; additionally, subjects earned $5 as a show-up fee.
We paid subjects in private immediately after the end of the experiment. On average,
subjects earned $28 (approximately equal to $47:5). Sessions lasted approximately
3 hours.
Before we discuss the experimental results, we would like to emphasize that our
experiment is a particularly challenging test for the informational channel of Önancial
contagion. One could have brought King and Wadhwani (1990)ís model to the lab-
20The use of experienced subjects is typical in trading experiments with double auctions, since
convergence to competitive equilibrium requires repetitions, even in simple environments (Smith,
1962). For example, Copeland and Friedman (1991) use subjects who had previously participated
in an asset market trading experiment; Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) make subjects participate
in double auctions experiments in two consecutive nights. In our experiment, we are interested in
the informational spillover from market A to market B. It is, therefore, important to make sure
that subjects have learned how to trade; otherwise the trading activity in market A could be pure
noise and reveal no information about the asset value.
21In Appendix B, we show that the training session was indeed useful for subjects to learn how
to trade.
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oratory by simply studying the behavior of subjects in market B who had observed
a price in market A set by the experimenters (which is tantamount to observing a
public signal). With respect to this set up, our experiment is richer in two dimen-
sions. First, subjects trading in market B had two sources of information: trading
activity in market A and their own private information. This by itself could have
impaired information aggregation in market B, while at the same time making the
inference problem from market A more complicated. Second, the information com-
ing from market A was not a public signal: every subject made his own judgement
on how well the price in market A reáected the true asset value in that market. In
the next section we will show that although subjects faced a complicated task, the
experimental results provide support for the theory of information contagion.
4 Results
We now turn to the discussion of the experimental results. We will Örst discuss
the results of Treatment I, where p = 0:5, and, therefore, theory predicts that
informational contagion occurs. Later, we will compare these results with those
of Treatment II, where p = 0 and, according to theory, there is no informational
contagion.
In our model, contagion is caused by an informational spillover from market A
to market B. Of course, the information that subjects in market B obtain from the
trading activity in market A depends on how well the price in that market aggregates
private information. For this reason, as a Örst step, in the next section we investigate
19
the aggregation of private information in market A.
4.1 TRADING AND PRICE CONVERGENCE IN MAR-
KET A
As we explained above, given the signal structure implemented in the laboratory,
the signals that subjects receive reveal V A: that is, there is enough information in
the market to learn V A through trading activity. Therefore, the price aggregates
private information if, at least by the end of the round, it equals V A (or, given our
transaction bonus, it di§ers from it by at most 5 liras).
The amount of trading activity we observed in the laboratory is consistent with
the volume of trade that the bonus we gave to subjects is expected to generate.
Recall that we paid subjects a bonus for the Örst Öve trades they executed in order
to give them an incentive to trade in an economy in which otherwise there would be
no gains from trade. Indeed, in the laboratory, we observed an average of 5 trades per
subject per round (without meaningful di§erences in subjectsí behavior depending
on whether they received a green (i.e., good) or a red (i.e., bad) signal, or a correct
or incorrect signal). Given that in each market there are 8 subjects and that a trade
involves two parties, overall we observed on average 20 trades per round (with a
median of 18:5 and a standard deviation of 6:3).22
To study the aggregation of information in market A, we consider the average of
the last Öve trade prices in each round, which we label the ìÖnal priceî and denote by
22These statistics refer to market A. The statistics for market B are similar (an average of 20:68
trades per round with a standard deviation of 7:13). For additional statistics on subjectsí trading
behavior, see Appendix C:6.
20
pLast5A . Figure 1 shows a histogram of the per-round distance (deÖned as the absolute
value of the di§erence) between the Önal price and V A. As the Ögure shows, in
almost 70 percent of the cases, the distance is less than 20 liras. The distribution is
heavily skewed to the right: the average distance is 23 liras, higher than the median,
which is less than 10 liras (see Table 2); in 20% of the rounds, the distance is higher
than 50 liras. In other words, the price does aggregate private information well, but
there are some rounds in which aggregation fails.23 ;24
Table 2. Distance of the Önal price of asset A from V A
The table shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of asset
A from V A. The Önal price is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column 1), or
of the last three trade prices (column 2), or of the trades that occurred in the last 30 seconds of a
round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trade
Mean 22:64 22:67 21:67
Median 9:29 8:67 8:60
Std. Dev. 27:86 28:51 28:37
N 60 60 52
These Öndings are conÖrmed by regression analysis. In particular, we ran the
following regression:
23We tried to understand whether the lack of price convergence in some rounds is the result of
di§erent trading strategies by subjects. Unfortunately, we did not Önd meaningful di§erences. For
instance, the proportion of trades and orders executed and posted by subjects with the correct
signal was similar in rounds where there was convergence and in those where there was not. The
only relevant Önding of the analysis was that in rounds in which the price converged to the wrong
value, at the beginning of the round subjects posted many orders far from their private expected
values (which, therefore, did not reveal their signals); this did not happen in rounds where there
was convergence. These abnormal quotes imply that the price was far from the fundamental since
the beginning of the rounds and the misalignment was never fully corrected. See Appendix C:6.
24These results are not di§erent when V A = 100 and when V A = 0; that is, we do not observe
asymmetry in information aggregation when the fundamental is high or low. See Appendix C:4.
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Figure 1. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V A. The Önal price is deÖned
as the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated by the solid line; the
median by the dashed line.
pLast5A;i = . + /V
A
i + "i;
where i is the round. As the Örst column of Table 3 shows, the slope coe¢cient is
positive and signiÖcant, but only equal to 0:5: only half the information that the
subjects receive is aggregated by the Önal price.25 According to the regression, when
the fundamental is 0, the expected Önal price is 23; and when the fundamental is
100, it is 78: In both instances, the Önal price moves from its unconditional expected
value of 50 toward the realization of the fundamental, but it is further away from it
than the 5 liras bonus justiÖes.
25We reject the hypothesis that the coe¢cient is equal to the theoretical value of 1 (p-value equal
to 0:01, using a cluster-robust t-test at the session level).
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Table 3. Regression results for market A
The table shows the regression results of the Önal price of asset A on V A. The Önal price is the
average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column 1), or of the last three trade prices (column
2), or of the trades that occurred in the last 30 seconds of a round (column 3). Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the session level. *, **, *** denote signiÖcance at the 10, 5, 1 percent
level, respectively.
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
V A
0:545""
(0:124)
0:546""
(0:126)
0:564""
(0:114)
Constant
23:10""
(8:380)
22:70""
(8:302)
22:56""
(8:210)
R-squared 0:475 0:464 0:496
N 60 60 52
Note that our results do not depend on how we deÖne the per-round Önal price,
as the second and third columns of Tables 2 and 3 show. The regression coe¢cients
do not meaningfully change if we deÖne the Önal price as the average price of the last
3 trades, or the average price of the trades that occurred over the last 30 seconds of
trading activity.26
In summary, our results show that Önal prices in market A are a noisy signal of the
asset value. Therefore, they could be used by subjects in market B to infer V A and,
in turn, to construct their beliefs on V B. To understand how rational agents form
their beliefs on V A by observing the prices in market A, we regressed V A on the Önal
price in a probit regression and estimated the conditional expected value of V A (i.e.,
the conditional probability that V A = 100). Figure 2 shows the conditional expected
26See also Appendix C:2. Note that in eight trading rounds, no transactions occurred in the last
30 seconds of trade. This explains why in column 3 of Tables 2 and 3 the average Önal price is
computed over 52 rather than 60 rounds. Finally, in Appendix C:5, we show that the regression
results do not change if we add session and/or round Öxed e§ects.
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Figure 2. Expected value of V A as a function of the Önal price in market A.
value of V A as a function of market Aís Önal price. For instance, the conditional
expected value of V A is around 28 for a Önal price of 20 and climbs to over 80 for a
Önal price of 80.27
Note that the expectations we obtain through the probit regression are very
similar to those that a Bayesian agent would compute after observing the empirical
frequencies of V A being equal to 0 or 100 for di§erent ranges of the Önal price (see
the Örst three columns of Table 4): Interestingly, there expectations are also very
close to the (average) beliefs we elicited from subjects trading in market B while
they were observing the trading activity in market A (last column of Table 4).28
27We report the coe¢cients of the probit regression in Table C1 in Appendix C:1.
28Recall that while one group was trading asset A, subjects in the other group had to state their
belief about the value of asset A (i.e., their expected value of the asset) when there was a remaining
trading time of 120, 60 and 10 seconds in market A. Here, and in the rest of the paper, we focus
on subjectsí elicited expectation when there were only 10 seconds of trading activity left in market
A. In Appendix F we carry out some additional analysis of subjectsí elicited beliefs.
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Table 4. Empirical Bayesian Updates
The table shows: 1) the frequencies with which the Önal price (deÖned as the average of the last Öve
trade prices in a round) belonged to a particular range, conditional on V A (columns 1 and 2); 2)
the Bayesian updates about V A computed using these frequencies (column 3); 3) average subjectsí
beliefs elicited 10 seconds before the end of the trading activity in market A (column 4).
Frequencies Bayesian updates Beliefs
V A = 0 V A = 100 Pr(V A = 100jpLast5A )
pLast5A > 75 0:09 0:71 0:89 85:8
50 < pLast5A ' 75 0:09 0:08 0:46 59:7
25 ' pLast5A ' 50 0:09 0:10 0:54 43:0
pLast5A < 25 0:73 0:10 0:13 10:7
Until now, we have focused on the price towards the end of the 200 seconds of
trading. Aggregation of information took some time to occur. In Figure 3, we show
the evolution of the distance between the price and V A over time. We divided the
trading round into 10 intervals and computed the average distance in each of these
intervals. As the Ögure shows, the price becomes closer and closer to the fundamental,
as private information is aggregated through the trading activity.29
29We computed the evolution of the distance between the price and V A also in trade- and quote-
time. Interestingly, most of the learning occurs in the Örst 20 trades (which is also the average
number of trades in the experiment). See Appendix C:3.
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Figure 3. Distance of the price of asset A from V A over time. The Ögure shows the
distance between the average price and V A for each interval of 20 seconds.
4.2 TRADING AND PRICE CONVERGENCE IN MAR-
KET B
We now turn our attention to market B. We conduct a similar analysis to that
of market A and study the behavior of the Önal price, deÖned, as in the previous
section, as the average of the last Öve trade prices. Figure 4 shows the histogram
of the per-round distance between the Önal price in market B and V B; Table 5
shows the mean, the median, and the standard deviation across rounds. As one can
observe, the distance between price and fundamental is higher than in market A (the
di§erence is signiÖcant at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test at session
26
Figure 4. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V B. The Önal price is deÖned
as the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated by the solid line; the
median by the dashed line.
level).
This is not surprising. In contrast to market A, the information that subjects
receive (i.e., the signals about C and the history of trading activity in market A)
does not reveal V B: there is not enough information in the market to learn the
fundamental through trading activity.30
The higher distance between Önal price and fundamental may be due to two
reasons: i) the fact that in market B there is less information about the fundamental
than in market A; and ii) the fact that the aggregation of private information in
market B is less e¢cient (e.g., because subjects, when interpreting their private
30The degree of convergence of the price to V B depended on the realisations of V A and C. The
price settled at a level further away from the fundamentals in those rounds in which V A 6= C:
Indeed, even theoretically, in such a case price convergence to V B should not occur (given that
subjects do not know whether V B is equal to V A or to C). See Appendix D:3.
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Table 5. Distance of the Önal price of asset B from V B
The table shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of
asset B from V B . The Önal price is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column 1),
or of the last three trade prices in a round (column 2), or of the trades that occurred in the last
30 seconds of a round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
Mean 29:93 29:54 29:01
Median 16:7 13:5 15:75
Std. Dev. 29:18 29:68 30:26
N 60 60 58
signal, have an additional source of information, the public information from market
A, that may confuse them). To gauge the ability of subjects in market B to aggregate
information, we compare the Önal price to the REE price. In the REE, trading
activity in markets A and B reveal both V A and C, but does not reveal whether V B
equals V A or C. For this reason, as discussed above, the REE price in B is 100 when
V A = C = 100; 0 when V A = C = 0; and 50 when V A 6= C. If the (Önal) price in
market B aggregates the information contained in the patterns of trading activity in
market A and in the signals, it should equal the REE price.
As Figure 5 and Table 6 show, the average distance between the Önal price and
the REE price is 25:9. This is not statistically di§erent from the distance in market
A (Wilcoxon signed-rank test at session levelóp-value = 0:20). In other words, there
is no evidence that the aggregation of information in market B is reduced by the fact
that the task that subjects are facing is harder.
In order to understand the aggregation of information in marketB, we also regress
the initial and the Önal price in market B over the realization of C and over the value
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Figure 5. Per-round distance between the Önal price and the REE. The Önal price is
deÖned as the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated by the solid
line; the median by the dashed line.
of the fundamental in market A:
pB;i = . + /1Ci + /2V
A
i + "i:
The initial price is deÖned as the average price of the Örst 5 trades in each round,
whereas the Önal price is deÖned, as before, as the average of the last 5.
The results of the initial-price regressions are reported in the Örst three columns of
Table 7. As the Örst column shows, the e§ect of C on the initial price is positive and
signiÖcant; it is also smaller than it would be if signals were immediately reáected in
the price at the beginning of the round (0:16 versus 0:5). This is not surprising, as the
aggregation of private information happens over time. Additionally, the e§ect of the
fundamental in A (V A), although positive, is both lower than what theory predicts
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Table 6. Distance of the Önal price of asset B from the REE price
The table shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of asset
B from the REE price. The Önal price is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column
1), or of the last three trade prices in a round (column 2), or of the trades that occurred in the last
30 seconds of a round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
Mean 25:90 25:92 25:32
Median 19:50 19:0 22:33
Std. Dev. 22:30 23:21 23:63
N 60 60 58
(0:15 versus 0:5) and non-signiÖcant. To understand this result, let us look at the
second column of Table 7, where we replaced V A with its conditional expectation
given by the probit regression Eprobit(V AjpLast5A ) (as illustrated in Section 4:1), that
is,
pB;i = . + /1Ci + /3E
probit(V Ai jpLast5A;i ) + "i:
The coe¢cient onEprobit(V AjpLast5A ) is signiÖcant and close to the theoretical value
of 0:5. That is, subjects trading in market B correctly incorporate the information
coming frommarket A. It is only because market Aís price is a noisy signal of V A that
the spillover from market A to market B is lower than the theoretical prediction.31
31In a recent paper, Longsta§ (2010) presents evidence against the information channel in the
case of the 2007-8 Önancial crisis (this evidence is ìof course limited to the speciÖc episode studiedî
as the author observes). The author Önds that the cross market spillover happened with a lag,
which he interprets as evidence against the information channel. His conclusions are based on
the assumption that markets are informationally e¢cient; if, instead, it took time for the price
to aggregate information he could not have concluded much from the lag in the spillover e§ect.
Our result shows that indeed this assumption is supported by the data: in our experiment the
information spillover from the other market occurs as soon as the second market opens.
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Table 7. Regression results for market B
The table shows the regression results of the initial (Önal) price of asset B on C and on V A in
column 1 (4). Columns 2 and 5 show the regression results using the conditional expectation of
V A (computed by the probit regression). Columns 3 and 6 show the regression results using the
average elicited belief at the end of the round. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
session level. *, **, *** denote signiÖcance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
Initial Price (Örst 5 trades) Final Price (last 5 trades)
C
0:165""
(0:043)
0:128""
(0:038)
0:132""
(0:035)
0:278""
(0:058)
0:235""
(0:047)
0:235""
(0:047)
V A
0:151
(0:083)
0:305"
(0:133)
Eprobit(V AjpLast5A )
0:418""
(0:065)
0:632""
(0:137)
Belief
0:410""
(0:065)
0:659""
(0:097)
Constant
33:49""
(6:679)
18:78""
(6:202)
22:53""
(6:435)
12:52
(7:825)
"5:616
(4:391)
"1:781
(2:765)
R-squared 0:235 0:463 0:475 0:385 0:563 0:624
Note also that, as shown in the third column of Table 7, the coe¢cient on subjectsí
expectations is virtually unchanged if, instead of using the Probit regression, we use
the average belief we elicited from subjects at the end of the round in market A (see
footnote 27):
pB;i = . + /1Ci + /4Beliefi + "i:
Let us now consider how the Önal price aggregates subjectsí information. In
the last three columns of the table, we regress the Önal price on the realizations
of C and on V A (column 4), on its conditional expected value computed through
a Probit regression (column 5), and on subjectsí average beliefs on V A elicited at
31
the end of trading activity in market A (column 6). If the Önal price aggregated
subjectsí signals correctly, the coe¢cient on C should be 0:5 (since V B = C only
with probability 0:5). In the last three columns of Table 7, the coe¢cient is positive
and signiÖcant, but approximately only half the theoretical value. This is a similar
result to what was observed in market A, where the coe¢cient of 0:5 was half its
theoretical counterpart.32 In both markets, the price aggregates subjectsí private
signals only partially.
Moreover, according to the theory, the coe¢cients on V A should be 0:5 (since
V B = V A with probability 0:5); in the regression, the coe¢cient is positive and
signiÖcant, but smaller than the theoretical one. Similarly to what happened for the
initial price, however, when we use as a regressor the conditional expectation of V A
the coe¢cient increases to approach its theoretical value.33 In other words, also when
we look at the Önal price, it is apparent that subjects incorporate the information
coming from the other market correctly.
In analyzing the price in market B, we computed subjectsí expectations about V A
as if subjects could only observe prices in market A. Of course, subjects could also
observe trades and quotes. One could wonder whether our results change when we
take this into account: To answer this question, we study subjectsí expectations as a
function of the trade imbalance (ìTI,î i.e. the di§erence between buy and sell orders)
and of the quote imbalance (ìQI,î i.e., the di§erence between the number of posted
bid and ask orders). In Table 8 we repeat the analysis of Table 7, assuming that
32In market A, full aggregation of private information would have implied that the coe¢cient on
V A was equal to 1:
33We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coe¢cient is equal to the theoretical oneó p-value =
0:38óusing a cluster-robust t-test at the session level.
32
subjects use the trade imbalance (columns 1 and 5), the quote imbalance (columns
2 and 6), and the trade and quote imbalance along with the Önal price (columns 3
and 7; and 4 and 8) to form their expectations on Market A. As one can see, neither
the estimated coe¢cient on C nor that on subjectsí expectation on V A changes
with respect to what presented in Table 7.34 In other words, our analysis is robust
to di§erent speciÖcations on how subjects learn from the other market. Although
the quote and trade imbalances do contain information, this information is also
aggregated by the market price.
As a further robustness check, we studied whether results change across rounds,
either because of learning e§ects or because subjectsí attention is lower at the end
of the experiment. In Appendix G, we replicated our empirical analysis dividing our
dataset into three subsamples: the Örst three rounds, the middle four rounds, and the
last three rounds. We do not Önd economically or statistically signiÖcant di§erences
across subsamples. Moreover, our regression results are robust to the inclusion of
session and round Öxed e§ects (see Appendix D:4).
Overall, the regression results suggest that the information inference from the
trading activity in market A is close to what theory predicts. In contrast, both
in market A and in market B, subjects have more di¢culties aggregating private
information. Although private signals are aggregated by the price, the aggregation
is not complete.
34As for Table 7, the expectations are computed through a Probit regression. The coe¢cients of
the regression are reported in Appendix C:1. Note that the Öt performance of the trade imbalance
and quote imbalance Probit regressions are similar (although slightly worse) to those of the price
regression.
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4.3 PRICECONVERGENCEWITHHIGHANDLOWFUN-
DAMENTAL VALUES
One may wonder whether information aggregation and spillover e§ects in market B
are di§erent according to whether the assetís fundamentals, V A and C, have high or
low values. For instance, such asymmetry may be the result of subjects exhibiting
panic behavior in the face of bad news or irrational exuberance in the face of good
news.
In footnote 23, we remarked that the level of information aggregation in market
A is very similar when V A = 0 and when V A = 100. In Table 9, we show the distance
between the price in market B and V B conditional on the realizations of V A and
C.35 Two observations are in order. First, as in market A, the distances between the
price and V B are very similar when V A = C = 0 and when V A = C = 100. This
indicates that good and bad information about the fundamentals are aggregated to
a similar extent.
Second, the distances between the price and V B are also very close in the two
cases when V A and C are di§erent, that is, when V A = 0 and C = 100 and when
V A = 100 and C = 0. In other words, the spillover e§ects from market A to market
B are not more pronounced when there is a ìcrisisî (bad news) in market A.
35For additional results see Appendix D:2.
35
Table 9. Distance of the Önal price of asset B from V B, conditional on V A and C.
The table shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of asset
B from V B , conditional on the values of V A and C. The Önal price is the average of the last Öve
trade prices in a round (column 1), or of the last three trade prices in a round (column 2), or of
the trades that occurred in the last 30 seconds of a round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
V A = 0; C = 0
Mean 20:12 19:67 18:05
Median 11:7 8:67 7:92
Std. Dev. 24:83 25:03 23:48
N 12 12 12
V A = 100; C = 100
Mean 25:43 25:58 24:82
Median 11:1 10 8:75
Std. Dev. 26:64 28:10 30:05
N 24 24 22
V A = 0; C = 100
Mean 38:96 38:9 37:90
Median 36:8 37:17 32:17
Std. Dev. 30:56 30:51 30:05
N 10 10 10
V A = 100; C = 0
Mean 39:6 38:10 38:62
Median 25:2 24:67 24:75
Std. Dev. 33:95 34:06 33:57
N 14 14 14
4.4 CONTAGION
The previous section clearly documents the existence of an informational spillover
from market A to market B. In the literature, Önancial contagion is usually charac-
terized as ìexcess correlationî among asset prices; in particular, there is contagion
36
between two markets when the correlation between asset prices is greater than that
between asset fundamentals: Corr(PA; PB) > Corr(V A; V B). In our theoretical
model, the informational spillover generates contagion: as we discussed above, the
correlation between fundamentals is 0:5, whereas that between prices is 0:71. Con-
tagion also occurs in the laboratory: across rounds, the correlation between Önal
prices is 0:67. This is an important result. It shows that the informational contagion
predicted by our theoretical model is also the outcome of subjectsí interactions in
a market setting; in other words, the trading strategies subjects put in place in the
laboratory lead to a contagion e§ect from market A to market B.
Not only is the price correlation in the laboratory higher than that between fun-
damentals, it is also very close to the theoretical one (0:67 is not signiÖcantly di§erent
from 0:71).36 This is somehow surprising since we know from the previous analysis
that the prices observed in the laboratory do not fully aggregate private information
(whereas the REE prices do). To shed light on this result, recall two observations
that we made in the previous section: i) in the two markets, signals are aggregated
only partially, and the level of aggregation is (approximately) similar; ii) subjects
attach (approximately) the theoretically correct weight to the information coming
from market A. Intuitively, the Örst observation implies that, holding constant the
informational spillover across markets, the variances of PA and PB and their covari-
ance are lower than what is predicted by the theory. The second observation implies
that the reduction in the covariance (with respect to the theoretical one) exactly
36We regressed the Önal price in market B on the Önal price in market A multiplied by the
ratio of the standard deviations of the two prices (and on a constant). We cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the estimated coe¢cient, which is equal to the correlation index, is equal to 0:71
using a cluster-robust t statisticóp-value equal to 0:8.
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o§sets the reduction in the variances of PA and PB, thus leading to a correlation
very close to the theoretical one. A simple model in which these two observations
hold (with no approximation) is: PA = .+ /V A + " and PB = 9 + 1
2
PA + 1
2
/C + :
(with . and 9 being two constants, 0 < / < 1 and " and : two uncorrelated error
terms). One can prove that, for " = : = 0, the correlation is identical to that of
our theoretical model (in which / = 1). In the experiment, of course, both error
terms have a positive variance, but their net e§ect on the correlation turns out to be
negligible.37
In other words, in our experiment, the same mechanism as in the theoretical
model creates a wedge between price correlation and fundamental correlation. The
only di§erence is that, in the experiment, learning is incomplete to a greater extent
than in the model; as a result, variances and covariance between prices are lower
than their theoretical counterparts. However, since subjects interpret information
coming from the other market correctly (i.e., there is the right level of information
spillover), the ratio between price covariance and variances (that is the correlation)
is the same as in the theory. As a result, there is correlation among prices in excess
of fundamental correlation.38
Finally, in the experiment, as in the theoretical model, the information coming
from market A increases the marketís informational e¢ciency. Indeed, if subjects
in market B had attached zero weight to the information coming from market A
37In Appendix A:2; we show that the correlation is decreasing in the variance of : but increasing
in the variance of ".
38As explained in Section 2:2, this result does not per se stem from learning being incomplete.
One can write a model of incomplete learning where there is no uncertainty on the idiosyncratic
or systematic nature of the shock, still the correlation between prices is equal to the correlation
between fundamentals.
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(i.e., if the coe¢cient on E(V A) in the regression reported in Table 7 had been zero),
the distance between the price and the fundamental would have been higher. Nev-
ertheless, in the rounds in which the value of asset B di§ers from that of asset A,
the information coming from market A is detrimental: the mean distance between
price and fundamental in these rounds is 40óhigher than 27, the average distance
when the asset values are equal.39 This shows the negative impact of information
contagion: although the information coming from other marketsí prices is on aver-
age valuable, it becomes counterproductive when price changes reáect idiosyncratic
shocks in those markets.
4.5 INDEPENDENT FUNDAMENTALS AND ABSENCE
OF CONTAGION: THE RESULTS OF TREATMENT
II
Until now, we have shown that allowing subjects to observe the history of trades
in another market generates Önancial contagion in the laboratory. This empirical
result agrees with the theoretical predictions: indeed, the correlation we obtain in
the laboratory is remarkably close to the equilibrium one. One may wonder, however,
whether in the laboratory contagion is really generated by informational spillovers,
as in the theoretical model, or rather whether it is a mere artifact, caused by subjects
in market B being ináuenced by the trades and prices in market A, independently
of their information content.
39The di§erence is statisitcally signiÖcant (Mann-Whitney one-sided test, p-value = 0:09). The
average distance across all rounds is 29.
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To tackle this issue, we ran Treatment II, in which we set p = 0; that is, V A
and V B are independently distributed (V B being equal to C). According to the
theory, since the asset fundamentals are independent, there should be no information
contagion.
In Table 10, we present the same regressions we had discussed in Table 7 for
Treatment I. The di§erences between the two treatments are striking. First, both
when we look at the behavior of the initial and of the Önal price, the coe¢cient on
the value of asset A and on its probit expectation are now much smaller than in
Treatment I, in fact, not signiÖcantly di§erent from zero. This is in accordance with
theory: there is no evidence of information spillover between markets when asset
fundamentals are independent. This result suggests that behavioral biases did not
cause the informational contagion observed in Treatment I (as would have been the
case if, for instance, subjects in market B were a§ected by the price in market A
independently of its information content); on the contrary, we Önd evidence that
subjects use the information coming from market A only in Treatment I, when such
information is relevant.40
Additionally, when we look at the Önal prices, the coe¢cient on C is now much
higher than what was reported for Treatment I (0:67 versus 0:28). As a matter of
fact, a statistical test reveals that this coe¢cient is not signiÖcantly di§erent from the
coe¢cient on the value of asset A in market A (in either treatment).41 This happens
because the distribution of V B (equal to C in this treatment) is the same as that of
40Subjectsí behavior in market A is similar to that of Treatment I. We report some descriptive
statistics and regression results in Appendix E.
41In both treatments, that coe¢cient is 0:55 (see Tables 3 and E2). The p-values for the test
that the coe¢cients in columns 3 and 4 are not di§erent from 0:55 are equal to 0:14.
40
Table 10. Regression results for Treatment II
The table shows the regression results of the initial (Önal) price of asset B on C and on V A in
column 1 (4). Columns 2 and 5 show the regression results using the conditional expectation
of V A (computed by the probit regression). Columns 3 and 6 show the regression results
using the average elicited belief at the end of the round. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the session level. *, **, *** denote signiÖcance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level,
respectively.
Initial Price (Örst 5 trades) Final Price (last 5 trades)
C
0:291"""
(0:037)
0:282"""
(0:036)
0:281"""
(0:036)
0:674"""
(0:071)
0:670"""
(0:069)
0:668"""
(0:069)
V A
0:052"
(0:025)
0:013
(0:065)
Eprobit(V AjpLast5A )
"0:025
(0:087)
"0:146"
(0:060)
Belief
"0:022
(0:073)
"0:116"
(0:050)
Constant
38:64"""
(4:621)
42:65""
(6:435)
42:60"""
(6:023)
14:43"
(6:900)
21:99""
(7:102)
20:83""
(6:700)
R-squared 0:427 0:414 0:414 0:627 0:640 0:637
V A, and subjects disregard the information coming from market A. Similarly to what
we observed in market A, in both treatments, private signals are only imperfectly
aggregated by the Önal price (the coe¢cient on C is less than 1).
Given these results, it is not surprising that the correlation between Önal prices
is "0:13, not statistically di§erent from that between fundamentals (i.e., zero).42 In
other words, when asset values are independent, we do not observe Önancial contagion
in the laboratory.
To gain more intuition on these aggregate results, we now look at how subjects
42We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the correlation is equal to 0 (by using the same test
discussed in footnote 34)óp-value = 0:13.
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set prices in the two treatments. We regress, separately for the two treatments, the
bid and ask prices that subjects posted in market B on their private information
and on their elicited belief that V A = 100; that is, for each treatment, we run the
following two regressions:
askj;i;k = . + /1Signalj;i + /2Beliefj;i + "j;i;k,
bidj;i;k = . + /1Signalj;i + /2Beliefj;i + "j;i;k,
where askj;i;k (bidj;i;k) is the kth observed ask (bid) order posted by subject j in
round i; Signali;j is a dummy variable taking value 1 if subject j0s signal in round
i is green (i.e., good) and zero otherwise; and Beliefj;i is subject jís elicited belief
in round i (see footnote 27). The results are reported in Table 11. In Treatment I,
the posted bid and ask prices are positively and signiÖcantly related not only to a
subjectís private information, but also to his belief about V A (see columns 1 and 2).
Subjectsí beliefs have a relatively large e§ect: a 10 unit increase in subjectsí beliefs
about V A results in, approximately, a 4 unit increase in the bid and in the ask price
subjects post in market B. In contrast, in Treatment II, while a subjectís private
information matters, there is no evicence that his assessment of the history of market
A does: indeed, the coe¢cients on subjectsí beliefs are not signiÖcant both for the
bid and the ask prices. We obtain analogous results if we look at the probability
that a subject posts a bid rather than an ask as a function of his private information
and his belief about V A through a probit regression:
42
dj;i;k = . + /1Signalj;i + /2Beliefj;i + "j;i;k,
where dj;i;k is an indicator taking value 1 if the kth observed quote posted by subject
j in round i is a bid. A subject with a high expectation on V A is signiÖcantly more
likely to post a bid (that is, to try and buy the asset) in Treatment I; this e§ect
disappears in Treatment II (see Table 12).43
Taken together, the results of Tables 11 and 12 show that, when posting bid and
ask prices, subjects react to the history of trading activity in market A when such
history carries information on V B (as in Treatment I), but disregard it when it does
not (as in Treatment II). As a result of their behavior, we observe contagion in
Treatment I but not in Treatment II.
43We obtain very similar results (available on request) if we run a logit regression or a linear
probability model.
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Table 11. Bid and Ask prices conditional on subjectsí private signal and belief
The table shows the results from a regression of ask and bid prices on a subjectís belief about the
value of good A and on a dummy equal to one if his private signal is green (i.e., good). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the session level. *, **, *** denote signiÖcance at the 10, 5,
1 percent level, respectively.
Treatment I Treatment II
Bid Ask Bid Ask
Green Signal
13:82""
(4:835)
10:75""
(3:101)
32:60""
(5:167)
22:73""
(4:163)
Belief
0:425""
(0:118)
0:376""
(0:080)
"0:051"
(0:023)
"0:076
(0:043)
Constant
13:91""
(3:16)
29:56"""
(2:61)
28:57""
(5:65)
42:89"""
(5:01)
R-squared 0:333 0:284 0:192 0:098
N 2; 244 2; 658 2; 347 2906
Table 12. Probability of posting a bid conditional on subjectsí private signal and
belief
The table shows the results from a probit regression of a dummy equal to one if the quote posted
by a subject is a bid on a dummy equal to one if his private signal is green (i.e., good) and on his
belief about the value of good A. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the session level.
*, **, *** denote signiÖcance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
Treatment I Treatment II
Green Signal
0:345"""
(0:024)
0:571"""
(0:071)
Belief
0:004"""
(0:001)
"0:001
(0:001)
Constant
"0:494"""
(0:059)
"0:380"""
(0:048)
N 4; 902 5; 253
44
5 Conclusions
In actual Önancial markets, traders often interpret price movements in one market
as conveying information about asset fundamental values in other markets. In an in-
áuential paper, King and Wadhwani (1990) showed that, in a Rational Expectations
Equilibrium, these informational spillovers across Önancial markets generate Önancial
contagion, a well-established empirical regularity. We tested the predictions of King
and Wadhwani (1990) in the laboratory. Our work supports the predictions of the
theory. Although in the laboratory private information is not perfectly aggregated,
subjects are able to use the information coming from the other market correctly.
As a result, the correlation between asset prices is very close to the theoretical one.
In principle, behavioral biases may lead subjects to under-react to the information
coming from another market (and focus, instead, on the information about their
own market) or, on the contrary, to overreact to it (for instance, a price decline in
another market may cause subjects to be more prone to sell); this, however, does
not happen in our experiment. Moreover, in the laboratory, we do not observe con-
tagion when theory suggests we should not, that is, when the history of trades and
prices in the other market conveys no relevant information. Overall, our experimen-
tal results show that the Rational Expectations Equilibrium performs remarkably
well in describing Önancial contagion and the comovement among asset prices gener-
ated by informational spillovers. As a result, in future work with Öeld data, one can
study informational contagion with higher conÖdence that the Rational Expectations
Equilibrium provides a good explanation of asset price comovements.
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Appendix (for online publication)
Appendix A: Theoretical Results
Appendix A.1: REE derivation
In this appendix, we derive the REE for the case of p = 0:5 (as in Treatment I of
the experiment); the derivation of the REE equilibrium for p = 0 (as in Treatment
II of the experiment) is similar. The analysis follows the logic of Grossman (1976)
and Grossman (1978), although applied to a much simpler setup. In order to Önd
the REE, let us Örst deÖne the Private Information Equilibrium (PIE), that is,
the equilibrium in which each agent only uses his private information and neglects
the information contained in the price. Figure A1 shows the PIE in market A
when V A = 0. Since the precision of the private signal is 0:75 and 8 agents trade
in market A, 6 agents evaluate the asset at 25 liras and 2 agents evaluate it at
75 liras. Bearing in mind that each agent is endowed with 4 units of the asset
and 500 liras, supply and demand curves are easily derived. For instance, let us
consider the supply curve. At a price lower than 25, no agent is willing to supply
the asset. At a price of 25, 6 agents are just indi§erent between holding and selling
the asset (the maximum supply is, therefore, 24 units). At any price between 25
and 75, these 6 agents supply all their endowment. At a price of 75, also the other
2 agents become weakly willing to supply the asset. For a price higher than 75,
all 32 units are supplied. The PIE price is 41:7, where demand and supply cross.
A similar analysis shows that the PIE price when V A = 100 is 75 (as illustrated
in Figure A2). Of course, these two prices cannot be a REE. Indeed from the Örst
price, agents infer that the value is 0 and from the second, that it is 100. Therefore
in the Örst case demand and supply become those illustrated in Figure A3; and
1
in the second case they look like in Figure A4. The REE prices are 0 and 100
respectively.
The analysis for market B follows the same logic. In Figure A5 we shows the
REE (assuming p = 0:5) when V A 6= C. The equilibrium price becomes 50.
Figure A1. Private Information Equilibrium conditional on V A = 0
2
Figure A2. Private Information Equilibrium conditional on V A = 100
Figure A3. Rational Expectations Equilibrium conditional on V A = 0
3
Figure A4. Rational Expectations Equilibrium conditional on V A = 100
Figure A5. Rational Expectations Equilibrium conditional on V A 6= C.
4
Appendix A.2: Correlations
In this section, we compute the correlation coe¢cients presented in Section
2:2. First, let us derive the correlation between the fundamentals. To do so, we
compute the variances and covariance of V A and V B:
V ar(V A) = E(V A
2
)! !E(V A)"2 = 1
2
1002 ! 502 = 2500
V ar(V B) = E(V B
2
)! !E(V B)"2 =
E(V B
2jV B = V A) Pr(V B = V A) + E(V B2jV B = C) Pr(V B = C)! !E(V B)"2 =
1
2
1002p+
1
2
1002(1! p)! 502 = 2500 = V ar(V A)
Cov(V A; V B) = Cov(V A; V BjV B = V A) Pr(V B = V A) + Cov(V A; V BjV B = C) Pr(V B = C) =
V ar(V A)p+ 0(1! p) = pV ar(V A)
Therefore, the correlation coe¢cient between fundamentals is:
Corr(V A; V B) =
pV ar(V A)p
V ar(V A)
p
V ar(V A)
= p.
We now turn to the computation of the correlation coe¢cient between prices.
In the REE, PA = V A and PB = pV A + (1 ! p)C. Therefore, variances and
covariance are:
5
V ar(PA) = V ar(V A) = 2500
V ar(PB) = V ar(pV A + (1! p)C) =
p2V ar(V A) + (1! p)2V ar(C) + 2Cov(V A; C) = V ar(V A)(1! 2p+ 2p2)
Cov(PA; PB) = Cov(V A; pV A + (1! p)C) =
pV ar(V A) + (1! p)Cov(V A; C) = pV ar(V A)
The correlation coe¢cient between prices is therefore given by
Corr(PA; PB) =
pV ar(V A)p
V ar(V A)
p
V ar(V A)(1! 2p+ 2p2) =
pp
(1! 2p+ 2p2) .
It is easy to verify that
pp
(1! 2p+ 2p2) > p for all 0 < p < 1.
For p = 0:5, Corr(PA; PB) = 0:71.
Now we turn to the computation of the correlation coe¢cient for the model
presented in Section 4:4.
Consider the case in which the prices in both markets aggregates the informa-
tion only partially. In particular, suppose that
PA = - + .V A and
6
PB = " + pPA + (1! p)$C.
In this case, the variances of the prices and their covariance can be expressed
as follows:
V ar(PA) = $2V ar(V A).
V ar(PB) = $2V ar(pV A + (1! p)C) = $2(1! 2p+ 2p2)V ar(V A).
Cov(PA; PB) = Cov($V A; $(pV A + (1! p)C)) =
$2
!
pV ar(V A) + (1! p)Cov(V A; C)" = $2pV ar(V A).
Therefore, the correlation coe¢cient is
Corr(PA; PB) =
$2pV ar(V A)q
$2V ar(V A)
q
$2(1! 2p+ 2p2)V ar(V A)
=
pp
(1! 2p+ 2p2) ,
which is equal to the correlation obtained above for the REE. The partial
information aggregation does not a§ect the correlation since it a§ects variances
and covariance in the same way.
Finally, we compute the correlation coe¢cient when
PA = , + $V A + "
and
7
PB = " + 1
2
PA + 1
2
#C + %
(note that, consistently with the text, we are considering the case in which
p = 1
2
).
In this case, the variances of the prices and their covariance can be expressed
as follows:
V ar(PA) = #2V ar(V A) + V ar(").
V ar(PB) =
1
4
#2V ar(V A) +
1
4
V ar(") +
1
4
#2V ar(C) + V ar(%)
Cov(PA; PB) =
1
2
#2V ar(V A) +
1
2
V ar(").
Therefore, the correlation coe¢cient is
Corr(PA; PB) =
#2V ar(V A) + V ar(")q""
#2V ar(V A) + V ar(")
#
(2#2V ar(V A) + V ar(") + 4V ar(%)
# .
Finally note that this expression is decreasing in V ar(%) but increasing in
V ar(").
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Appendix B: Results for the training phase of
the experiment
Recall that in each session, and for both treatments, there was a training phase
with the purpose of familiarizing subjects with the trading platform. The training
phase consisted of 10 rounds of trading in one market; the trading protocol was
identical to the one we used for market A in the real experiment.
In this appendix, we show that the training phase was useful for subjects to
familiarize themselves with the trading platform and to learn how to trade in a
market. To this aim, we compare how the private information was aggregated in
the Örst and in the last Öve rounds of the training phase. Since the training phase
was identical in Treatment I and II, we pooled together all rounds from both
treatments. Figures B1 and B2 show the distance of the Önal price from the asset
fundamental value in the Örst and in the last Öve rounds, respectively. As can be
easily observed, the price aggregates private information to a greater extent in the
last Öve rounds. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conÖrms this result: the hypothesis
that the two distributions in Figures B1 and B2 are the same is rejected (p-value
equal to 0:001).
9
Figure B1. Distance between the Önal price and V A in the Örst Öve rounds of
the training phase. The Önal price is deÖned as the average of the last Öve trade prices in a
round. The mean is indicated by the solid line; the median by the dashed line.
Figure B2. Distance between the Önal price and V A in the last Öve rounds of
the training phase. The Önal price is deÖned as the average of the last Öve trade prices in a
round. The mean is indicated by the solid line; the median by the dashed line.
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Appendix C: Additional Results for Section 4.1
Appendix C.1: Probit regression of V A on the Önal price
In this subsection, we describe the probit regression that we use to estimate the
conditional expected value of V A. In our main speciÖcation, we run the following
regression:
I(V Ai = 100) = # + $p
Last5
A;i + "i,
where I(V Ai = 100) is an indicator for V
A being equal to 100 in round i, pLast5A;i
is the average Önal price of asset A in round i and "i ! N(0; +2) is a normally
distributed error term. The results of this regression are reported in the Örst
column of Table C1. The results reported in columns 2 to 5 of the same Table
are from probit regressions in which we replace pLast5A;i with the trade imbalance
"TI," deÖned as the di§erence between the total number of trades that occurred
at the prevailing ask price (buys) and the total number of trades that occurred at
the prevailing bid price (sells); the quote imbalance "QI," deÖned as the di§erence
between the total number of buy o§ers (bids) and the total number of sell o§ers
(asks) (column 3); the average Önal price and the trade imbalance (column 4); and
the average Önal price and the quote imbalance (column 5). In order to compare
across speciÖcations, we also report measures of goodness of Öt for each probit
model that we have estimated. In particular, we computed:
" Mc Faddenís R-squared, R2MF = 1# logLlogL0 , where L is the likelihood function
of the (unrestricted) probit and L0 is the likelihood function of the restricted
probit model in which $ = 0
11
! R2 = 1
N
NP
i=1
h
I(V Ai = 100)&
#
$!%pLast5A;i
'
$
+ (1" I(V Ai = 100))
#
1" &
#
$!%pLast5A;i
'
$$i
,
where & is the cdf of "
! D1 =
s
1
N
NP
i=1
[V Ai " E(V Ai )]2,
! D2 = 1N
NP
i=1
''V Ai " E(V Ai )''.
Table C1. Probit regressions for market A
The table shows the results of a probit regression of asset Aí s value on: the Önal price (column
1); the trade imbalance TI (column 2); the quote imbalance QI (column 3); the Önal price and the
trade imbalance (column 4); the Önal price and the quote imbalance (column 5). R2MF denotes
Mc Faddenís R squared and R2, D1, D2 are deÖned as above. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the session level. *, **, *** denote signiÖcance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pLast5A 0:029
""" 0:031""" 0:020"
(0:007) (0:005) (0:011)
TI 0:086"" "0:018
(0:041) (0:038)
QI 0:058""" 0:026
(0:013) (0:017)
Constant "1:164""" 0:160 0:661""" "1:237""" "0:560
(0:294) (0:128) (0:166) (0:214) (0:589)
R2MF 0:406 0:125 0:361 0:409 0:436
R2 0:758 0:609 0:732 0:760 0:770
D1 34:842 44:205 36:374 34:768 34:096
D2 4:915 6:256 5:174 4:901 4:791
Appendix C.2: Price convergence in market A
In this subsection we replicate Figure 1, by showing the histograms of the dis-
tance between the Önal price of asset A and the fundamental value using di§erent
deÖnitions for the Önal price. In Figure C1 the Önal price is computed as the
12
average of the last three trade prices in a round. In Figure C2 it is computed as
the average of the trade prices in the last 30 seconds of trade in a round.
Figure C1. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V A. The Önal price is
deÖned as the average of the last three trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated by the
solid line; the median by the dashed line.
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Figure C2. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V A. The Önal price
is deÖned as the average trade prices in the last 30 seconds of trade in a round. The mean is
indicated by the solid line; the median by the dashed line.
Appendix C.3: Price convergence in market A; trade and quote time
This subsection replicates the convergence result of Figure 3 in trade time
(Figure C3) and quote time (Figure C4).
Note that the right tail of Figure C4 is based on a small number of observations:
the number of quotes was higher than 90 in 3% of the rounds only. In 88% of the
rounds, the number of quotes was not higher than 80.
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Figure C3. Distance of the price of assetA from V A in trade times. The Ögure shows
the average distance between the trading price and the asset fundamental value for transactions
1-3, 4-6, 7-9, etc.
15
Figure C4. Distance of the price of asset A from V A in quote times. The Ögure
shows the average distance between the trading price and the asset fundamental value for quotes
1-10, 11-20, 21-30, etc.
Appendix C.4: Price convergence in market A conditional on high
or low fundamental values
This subsection replicates Figure 1 and Table 2 separately for the case of V A =
0 and V A = 100. See Figure C5 and Table C2.
16
Figure C5. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V A, conditional on
V A = 0 and on V A = 100.
17
Table C2. Distance of the Önal price of asset A from V A, conditional on V A.
The table shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of
asset A from V A for V A = 0, V A = 100 and for all rounds. The Önal price is the average of the
last Öve trade prices in a round (column 1), or of the last three trade prices in a round (column
2), or of the trades occurred in the last 30 seconds of a round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
V A = 0
Mean 23:10 22:70 22:56
Median 9:1 8:17 8:17
Std. Dev. 28:83 28:91 28:82
N 22 22 22
V A = 100
Mean 22:38 22:66 21:01
Median 9:6 9:17 9:1
Std. Dev. 27:64 28:67 28:51
N 38 38 30
All
Mean 22:65 22:67 21:67
Median 9:3 8:67 8:6
Std. Dev. 27:85 28:51 28:37
N 60 60 52
Appendix C.5: Session and round Öxed e§ects
This subsection replicates Table 3 adding Öxed e§ects at the round and at the
session level. See Table C3.
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Appendix C.6: Subjectsí trading behavior
In this subsection we present statistics on subjects trading behavior in all
rounds, in rounds in which the price converges to the fundamental (jpLast5A "V Aj <
30) and in rounds in which the price converges to the wrong value (jpLast5A "V Aj >
70). All the variables reported in Table C4 are self explanatory except the ìNum-
ber of asks and bids against private information 1,î deÖned as the number of asks
(bids) posted by a subject with a green (i.e., good) signal at a price greater (lower)
than 75 plus the number of asks (bids) posted by a subject with a red (i.e., bad)
signal at a price greater (lower) than 25; and the ìNumber of asks and bids against
private information 2,î deÖned as the number of bids posted by a subject with a
green signal at a price lower than 50 plus the number of asks posted by a subject
with a red signal at a price higher than 50. As one can notice, for both these
measures, the number of quotes against private information in the Örst 30 seconds
of a round was higher when, eventually, the price converged to the wrong value.
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Appendix D: Additional Results for Section 4.2
Appendix D.1: Price convergence in market B
In this subsection, we replicate Figures 4 and 5 by showing the histograms for
market B of the distance between the Önal price and V B (Figures D1!D2) and of
the distance between the Önal price and the REE price (Figures D3!D4), using
di§erent deÖnitions for the Önal price. In Figures D1 and D3 the Önal price is
deÖned as the average of the last three trade prices in a round, whereas in Figure
D2 and D4 it is deÖned as the average of the trade prices in the last 30 seconds
of trade in a round.
Figure D1. Per-round di§erence between the Önal price and V B. The Önal price is
deÖned as the average of the last three trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated by the
solid line; the median by the dashed line.
22
Figure D2. Per-round di§erence between the Önal price and V B. The Önal price
is deÖned as the average trade prices in the last 30 seconds of trade in a round. The mean is
indicated by the solid line; the median by the dashed line.
Figure D3. Per-round distance between the Önal price and the REE. The Önal
price is deÖned as the average of the last three trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated
by the solid line; the median by the dashed line.
23
Figure D4. Per-round distance between the Önal price and the REE. The Önal
price is deÖned as the average trade prices in the last 30 seconds of trade in a round. The mean
is indicated by the solid line; the median by the dashed line.
Appendix D.2: Price convergence in market B conditional on high
or low fundamental values
This subsection replicates Figures 4 and 5 and Table 6 separately for the fol-
lowing cases: (V A = 0; C = 0), (V A = 100; C = 100), (V A = 0; C = 100) and
(V A = 100; C = 0). See Figures D5 and D6 and Table D1.
24
Figure D5. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V B, conditional on
(V A = 0; C = 0); (V A = 100; C = 100); (V A = 0; C = 100); (V A = 100; C = 0).
25
Figure D6. Per-round distance between the Önal price and the REE conditional
on (V A = 0; C = 0); (V A = 100; C = 100); (V A = 0; C = 100); (V A = 100; C = 0).
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Table D1. Distance of the Önal price of asset B from the REE, conditional on
V A and C.
The table shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of
asset B from the REE, conditional on the values of V A and C and for all rounds. The Önal price
is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column 1), or of the last three trade prices
in a round (column 2), or of the trades occurred in the last 30 seconds of a round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
V A = 0; C = 0
Mean 20:12 19:67 18:05
Median 11:7 8:67 7:92
Std. Dev. 24:83 25:03 23:48
N 12 12 12
V A = 100; C = 100
Mean 25:43 25:58 24:82
Median 11:1 10 8:75
Std. Dev. 26:64 28:10 30:05
N 24 24 22
V A = 0; C = 100
Mean 26:04 25:97 27:04
Median 25:5 25:33 25:6
Std. Dev. 17:77 17:85 17:46
N 10 10 10
V A = 100; C = 0
Mean 31:57 31:81 31:10
Median 35:1 37 33:17
Std. Dev. 13:98 14:94 14:99
N 14 14 14
All
Mean 25:90 25:92 25:32
Median 19:5 19 22:33
Std. Dev. 22:30 23:21 23:63
N 60 60 58
Appendix D.3: Price convergence in market B conditional on the
fundamental values V A and V B
This subsection replicates Figure 4 and Table 5 separately for the following
cases: (V B = V A = C), (V B = C 6= V A) and (V B = V A 6= C). See Figure D7
27
Figure D7. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V B, conditional on
V B = V A = C; V B = C 6= V A; V B = V A 6= C.
and Table D2.
28
Table D2. Distance of the Önal price of asset B from V B, conditional on V B
being equal to V A or C.
The table shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of
asset B from V B for V B = V A = C, V B = C 6=V A, V B = V A 6=C and for all rounds. The Önal
price is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column 1), or of the last three trade
prices in a round (column 2), or of the trades occurred in the last 30 seconds of a round (column
3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
V B = V A = C
Mean 23:66 23:66 22:43
Median 11:1 10 8:75
Std. Dev. 25:82 26:90 27:73
N 36 36 34
V B = C 6= V A
Mean 40:12 39:54 39:48
Median 28:2 29 29
Std. Dev. 35:39 35:62 35:80
N 13 13 13
V B = V A 6= C
Mean 38:4 37:12 36:95
Median 33:6 35 25
Std. Dev. 28:88 28:65 27:97
N 11 11 11
All
Mean 29:93 29:54 29:01
Median 16:7 13:5 15:75
Std. Dev. 29:18 29:68 30:26
N 60 60 58
Appendix D.4: Session and round Öxed e§ects
This subsection replicates Table 7 adding Öxed e§ects at the round and at the
session level. See Table D3.
29
T
ab
le
D
3.
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
ch
ec
ks
fo
r
m
ar
ke
t
B
.
T
he
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
re
su
lt
s
of
th
e
in
it
ia
lp
ri
ce
(p
an
el
A
)
an
d
th
e
Ön
al
pr
ic
e
(p
an
el
B
)
of
as
se
t
B
on
C
an
d
on
V
A
(c
ol
um
ns
1
to
4)
.
C
ol
um
ns
5
to
8
sh
ow
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
re
su
lt
s
us
in
g
th
e
co
nd
it
io
na
l
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
on
of
V
A
(c
om
pu
te
d
by
th
e
pr
ob
it
re
gr
es
si
on
).
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
p
or
ts
re
gr
es
si
on
re
su
lt
s
w
it
h
no
Öx
ed
e§
ec
ts
(c
ol
um
ns
1
an
d
5)
;
se
ss
io
n
Öx
ed
e§
ec
ts
(c
ol
um
ns
2
an
d
6)
;
ro
un
d
Öx
ed
e§
ec
ts
(c
ol
um
ns
3
an
d
7)
;
se
ss
io
n
an
d
ro
un
d
Öx
ed
e§
ec
ts
(c
ol
um
ns
4
an
d
8)
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
se
ss
io
n
le
ve
l.
*,
**
,
**
*
de
no
te
si
gn
iÖ
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
,
5,
1
p
er
ce
nt
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
P
an
el
A
:
In
it
ia
l
pr
ic
e
C
0:
16
5!
!
0:
16
7!
!
0:
11
8
0:
11
6
0:
13
0!
!
0:
13
8!
!
0:
10
4
0:
11
2
(0
:0
43
)
(0
:0
42
)
(0
:0
67
)
(0
:0
65
)
(0
:0
38
)
(0
:0
39
)
(0
:0
56
)
(0
:0
56
)
V
A
0:
15
1
0:
16
3!
0:
13
5
0:
15
0!
(0
:0
83
)
(0
:0
77
)
(0
:0
72
)
(0
:0
64
)
E
p
r
o
bi
t (
V
A
jpL
a
st
5
A
)
0:
42
9!
!
0:
40
5!
!
0:
41
2!
!
0:
38
0!
!!
(0
:0
66
)
(0
:0
60
)
(0
:0
68
)
(0
:0
47
)
C
on
st
33
:4
9!
!
3:
19
1
44
:7
6!
14
:7
3
19
:5
6!
!
"6
:3
16
25
:3
4!
0:
19
3
(6
:6
79
)
(7
:3
66
)
(1
7:
90
4)
(1
7:
70
2)
(6
:0
76
)
(5
:3
20
)
(1
1:
58
6)
(9
:9
40
)
Se
ss
io
n
F
E
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
Y
E
S
R
ou
nd
F
E
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0:
23
5
0:
55
3
0:
33
7
0:
65
2
0:
47
1
0:
73
5
0:
49
8
0:
76
3
P
an
el
B
:
F
in
al
pr
ic
e
C
0:
27
8!
!
0:
26
6!
!
0:
24
1!
!
0:
22
1!
0:
23
9!
!
0:
23
5!
!
0:
23
2!
!
0:
22
4!
!
(0
:0
58
)
(0
:0
69
)
(0
:0
79
)
(0
:0
99
)
(0
:0
48
)
(0
:0
58
)
(0
:0
49
)
(0
:0
68
)
V
A
0:
30
5!
0:
30
8!
0:
30
9!
!
0:
31
6!
!
(0
:1
33
)
(0
:1
32
)
(0
:1
09
)
(0
:1
04
)
E
p
r
o
bi
t (
V
A
jpL
a
st
5
A
)
0:
64
4!
!
0:
61
4!
!
0:
73
3!
!!
0:
69
4!
!!
(0
:1
41
)
(0
:1
42
)
(0
:1
00
)
(0
:0
76
)
C
on
st
12
:5
2
"1
1:
80
37
:2
6
13
:8
3
"4
:2
13
"2
2:
65
!!
6:
10
5
"1
0:
57
(7
:8
25
)
(1
0:
41
0)
(2
2:
62
3)
(2
5:
79
6)
(4
:1
65
)
(7
:6
52
)
(1
2:
56
2)
(1
2:
99
1)
Se
ss
io
n
F
E
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
Y
E
S
R
ou
nd
F
E
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
Y
E
S
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0:
38
5
0:
54
4
0:
45
7
0:
61
8
0:
56
7
0:
68
7
0:
64
5
0:
76
1
30
Appendix E: Additional Treatment II
In the text, when we described Treatment II, we only reported some results
for market B, which is the main object of our interest. In this appendix, we report
the results for market A and some additional results for market B.
Appendix E.1: Distance between the Önal price and the asset value
in market A
Table E1 reports the mean, median, and standard deviation for the distance
between the asset value and the Önal price (deÖned in three di§erent ways). Figure
E1 reports the histogram of this distance (when the Önal price is computed as the
average of the last Öve trade prices).
Table E1. Distance of the Önal price of asset A from V A
The table shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of
asset A from V A. The Önal price is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column
1), or of the last three trade prices (column 2), or of the trades occurred in the last 30 seconds
of a round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trading
Mean 22:16 21:34 22:18
Median 5:6 4:5 4:25
Std. Dev. 30:40 30:77 33:03
N 60 60 56
31
Figure E1. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V A. The Önal price is
deÖned as the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated by the solid
line; the median by the dashed line.
Appendix E.2: Regression results for market A
This subsection replicates, for Treatment II, Table 3 adding Öxed e§ects at
the round and at the session level. See Table E2.
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Appendix E.3: Empirical Bayesian updates
Table E3 reports the frequencies of cases in which the last price was in a speciÖc
interval. It also reports the beliefs of a Bayesian agent relying on these frequencies
and the average elicited beliefs at the end of the round. Figure E2 shows the
conditional expected value of V A obtained from a probit regression of V A on the
Önal price.
Table E3. Empirical Bayesian Updates
The table shows: 1) the frequencies with which the Önal price (deÖned as the average of the last
Öve trade prices in a round) belonged to a particular range, conditional on V A (columns 1 and
2); 2) the Bayesian updates about V A computed using these frequencies (column 3); 3) average
subjectsí beliefs elicited 10 seconds before the end of the trading activity in market A (column
4).
Frequencies Bayesian updates Beliefs
V A = 0 V A = 100 Pr(V A = 100jpLast5A )
pLast5A > 75 0:09 0:68 0:88 89:0
50 < pLast5A " 75 0:09 0:18 0:66 63:2
25 " pLast5A " 50 0:06 0:04 0:36 35:0
pLast5A < 25 0:75 0:10 0:12 13:9
34
Figure E2. Expected value of V A as a function of the Önal price in market A.
Appendix E.4: Price convergence in market A
In this subsection, we replicate Figure 3 and Figures C3 and C4 (Appendix
C:3) for Treatment II. Figure E3 shows price convergence over time; Figures E4
and E5 show price convergence in trade-time and in quote-time, respectively.
35
Figure E3. Distance of the price of asset A from V A over time. The Ögure shows
the distance between the average price and V A for each interval of 20 seconds.
Figure E4. Distance of the price of assetA from V A in trade times. The Ögure shows
the average distance between the trading price and the asset fundamental value for transactions
1-3, 4-6, 7-9, etc.
36
Figure E5. Distance of the price of asset A from V A in quote times. The Ögure
shows the average distance between the trading price and the asset fundamental value for quotes
1-10, 11-20, 21-30, etc.
Note that the right tail of Figure E5 is based on a small number of observations:
the number of quotes was higher than 90 in 7% of the rounds only. In 82% of the
rounds, the number of quotes was not higher than 80.
Appendix E.5: Distance between the Önal price and the asset value
in market B
Table E4 reports the mean, median, and standard deviation for the distance
between the asset value and the Önal price (deÖned in three di§erent ways). Figure
E6 reports the histogram of this distance (when the Önal price is computed as the
average of the last Öve trade prices).
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Table E4. Distance of the Önal price of asset A from V B
The table shows the mean, median and standard deviation of the distance of the Önal price of
asset B from V B . The Önal price is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column
1); of the last three trade prices in a round (column 2); or of the trades occurred in the last 30
seconds of a round (column 3).
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trade
Mean 16:39 15:82 15:03
Median 4:1 3:7 3:7
Std. Dev. 25:97 26:02 24:95
N 60 60 54
Figure E6. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V B. The Önal price is
deÖned as the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round. The mean is indicated by the solid
line; the median by the dashed line.
Appendix E.6: Regression results for market B
This subsection replicates, for Treatment II, Table D3. See Table E5.
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Appendix F: Analysis of beliefs
Recall that in our experiment, while a group of subjects traded in market A,
the other group (who would later trade in market B) observed market A prices and
trading activity. While they were doing so, subjects in the latter group were asked
to report their belief on the value of asset A being 100. They had to do so on three
occasions: when the remaining trading time was 120, 60 and 10 seconds. In this
appendix, we present a brief analysis of these data. For expositional convenience,
we will sometimes refer to the beliefs when the remaining trading time was 120,
60 and 10 seconds as the initial, intermediate and Önal beliefs.
First of all, it is instructive to look at the evolution of beliefs over time. Figures
F1 and F2 show the average distance (deÖned as the absolute value of the di§er-
ence) between asset Aís value and the subjectsí beliefs respectively for Treatment
I and II. As one would expect, subjectsí expectations tend to approach the value
of the fundamental as time goes by. The distance of the value of asset A from
the initial belief is around 33, whereas that from the Önal belief is only 25. As we
know, the price in market A converged over time to the value of the asset; as this
happened, subjects in group B also made better predictions on V A. Nevertheless,
since price aggregation was not perfect, subjectsí beliefs at the end of the round
are still 25 units away from V A.
To understand better how subjects form their expectations, we computed the
di§erence between the subjectsí Önal beliefs and the average of all trade prices
occurring between the intermediate and the Önal beliefs. The Önal belief follows
the price observed in market A: in 62% of the cases, the di§erence between the
belief and the price was between !10 and 10 units. In Table F1, we report the
results of a regression of subjectsí beliefs on asset Aís average price in the 50
40
Figure F1. Distance between subjectsí beliefs and V A in Treatment I.
seconds before the belief elicitation. The upper (lower) panel refers to Treatment
I (Treatment II). The coe¢cients are all statistically signiÖcant and vary between
0:66 and 0:87, indicating that beliefs followed the observed prices quite closely.
41
Figure F2. Distance between subjectsí beliefs and V A in Treatment II.
Table F1. Regression of subjectsí beliefs on trade prices
The table shows the regression results of subjectsí initial (column 1), intermediate (column 2)
and Önal (column 3) beliefs on market Aí s prices. The upper (lower) panel shows the results for
Treatment I (Treatment II).
Initial belief Intermediate belief Final belief
Treatment I
Price 0:748!!! 0:837!!! 0:869!!!
(0:101) (0:064) (0:044)
Constant 10:96 6:171 4:289
(8:499) (4:626) (3:341)
R-squared 0:57 0:73 0:74
N 464 464 463
Treatment II
Price 0:656!!! 0:774!!! 0:831!!!
(0:035) (0:025) (0:019)
Constant 16:71!!! 10:40!! 8:825!!
(2:198) (2:657) (1:672)
R-squared 0:49 0:64 0:68
N 478 456 472
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Appendix G: (No) learning e§ects
In this section, we check the robustness of the results across the full duration of
the experiment. In other words, we test whether there are signiÖcant di§erences in
subjectsí behavior across rounds because of learning e§ects or because of a decrease
in attention in the last rounds of the experiment.
We do so in two ways. First, we test that the degree of convergence of the
Önal price to the true asset value (and to the REE) does not change between the
Örst 3 rounds, the middle 4 rounds and the last 3 rounds of each session. Second,
we check the robustness of our regression results by adding dummy variables for
the middle 4 rounds and the last 3 rounds, and by interacting them with the
regressors. Overall, we Önd that subjectsí behavior did not change over the course
of the experiment.
Appendix G.1: Market A
We start by considering the aggregation of information in market A; replicating
the results of Figure 1. Figure G1 plots the histogram of the distance between the
Önal price (deÖned as the average of the last 5 transactions) and V A for the Örst 3
rounds (upper left panel), the middle 4 rounds (upper right panel) and the last 3
rounds (lower left panel). As one can see, there is little di§erence among the three
distributions. This is conÖrmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality
of the distribution in the Örst or in the last 3 rounds to the distribution in the
middle 4 rounds (p-values reported in Table G1).
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Figure G.1. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V A in the Örst 3;
middle 4 and last 3 rounds
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Table G.1. KS test, distance between the Önal price of asset A and V A
The table reports the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The null hypothesis is that the
distribution of the distance between the Önal price and the value of asset A in the middle 4
rounds is equal to the distribution of the same distance in the Örst 3 rounds (row 1) or in the
last 3 rounds (row 2).
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value
H0 : Middle 4 rounds = First 3 rounds 0:978
H0 : Middle 4 rounds = Last 3 rounds 0:896
Furthermore, we check that regression results of Table 3 are stable for the full
length of the experiment. We estimate the following equation:
pAi = #0 + #1V
A
i + #2V
A
i ! Mi + #3V Ai ! Li + #4Mi + #5Li + "i,
where pAi is the Önal price of asset A in round i = 1; :::; 60; V
A
i is the true value
of asset A; Mi and Li are, respectively, indicators for the middle 4 rounds and the
last 3 rounds. Our focus is on coe¢cients #2 and #3; values signiÖcantly di§erent
from zero imply that the impact of V A on pA is di§erent throughout the rounds.
Similarly to Table 3, we run three regressions, each for a di§erent deÖnition of the
Önal price. Results are reported in Table G2.
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Table G.2. Robustness checks for market A
The tables shows the regression results of the Önal price of asset A on V A, dummy variables for
the middle 4 rounds (M) and the last 3 rounds (L) and their interactions with V A. The Önal
price is the average of the last Öve trade prices in a round (column 1), or of the last three trade
prices (column 2), or of the trades that occurred in the last 30 seconds of a round (column 3).
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the session level. *, **, *** denote signiÖcance
at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
Last 5 trades Last 3 trades Last 30 seconds of trade
V A 0.487** 0.502** 0.565**
(0.108) (0.106) (0.131)
V A !M 0.038 0.019 -0.041
(0.110) (0.115) (0.153)
V A ! L 0.142 0.125 0.050
(0.085) (0.082) (0.135)
M -12.560 -12.194 -12.358
(12.781) (12.733) (12.820)
L -27.320* -27.800* -28.300*
(12.912) (12.266) (11.967)
Constant 36.160** 35.667** 35.733**
(13.327) (12.848) (12.820)
H0 : %2 = %3, p-value 0.449 0.459 0.613
N 60 60 52
None of the interaction terms are statistically signiÖcant, indicating that ag-
gregation of information about V A does not di§er in the middle four rounds or in
the last three rounds as compared to the Örst three rounds. Moreover, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the interaction coe¢cients on the middle and last
three rounds are the same (second to last row of Table G2).
Appendix G.2: Market B
Figures G2 and G3 replicate Figures 4 and 5 by showing the distance between
the Önal price and the true value of asset B (Figure G2) and the REE (Figure G3)
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Figure G.2. Per-round distance between the Önal price and V B
for the Örst 3 rounds (upper left panels), the middle 4 rounds (upper right panels)
and the last 4 rounds (lower left panels). Moreover, in Tables G3 and G4 we report
the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of the distribution in the
Örst or in the last 3 rounds to the distribution in the middle 4 rounds. Overall the
Figures show that results are quite stable across rounds, suggesting that there are
not substantial di§erences in the way subjects process the information in market
B across the experiment .
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Figure G.3. Per-round distance between the Önal price and the REE
Table G.3. KS test, distance between the Önal price of asset B and V B
The table reports the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The null hypothesis is that the
distribution of the distance between the Önal price and the value of asset B in the middle 4
rounds is equal to the distribution of the same distance in the Örst 3 rounds (row 1) or in the
last 3 rounds (row 2).
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value
H0 : Middle 4 rounds = First 3 rounds 0:250
H0 : Middle 4 rounds = Last 3 rounds 0:978
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Table G.4. KS test, distance between the Önal price of asset B and the REE
The table reports the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The null hypothesis is that the
distribution of the distance between the Önal price of asset B and the REE in the middle 4
rounds is equal to the distribution of the same distance in the Örst 3 rounds (row 1) or in the
last 3 rounds (row 2).
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value
H0 : Middle 4 rounds = First 3 rounds 0:896
H0 : Middle 4 rounds = Last 3 rounds 0:250
Finally, similarly to what we did for market A, we replicated Table 7 by adding
dummy variables for the middle 4 and last 3 rounds and interacting them with the
regressors. In other words, we estimate the following regressions:
pB;i = #0+#1Ci+#2Ci!Mi+#3Ci!Li+#4V Ai +#5V Ai !Mi+#6V Ai !Li+#7Mi+#8Li+"i,
pB;i = )0 + )1Ci + )2Ci ! Mi + )3Ci ! Li + )4Eprobit(V Ai jpLast5A;i )+
)5E
probit(V Ai jpLast5A;i ) ! Mi + )6Eprobit(V Ai jpLast5A;i ) ! Li + )7Mi + )8Li + "i,
for i = 1; :::; 60. Depending on the speciÖcation, pB;i is either the initial price of
asset B (deÖned as the average of the Örst 5 transactions) or the Önal price of
asset B (deÖned as the average of the last 5 transactions). As already discussed
in the paper, we denote with Eprobit(V Ai jpLast5A;i ) the conditional expectation of V A
given by a Probit regression of the value of asset A on the Önal price of asset A.1
Results are shown in Table G5. Estimated coe¢cients for interaction terms are
1We tested and could reject the hypothesis that the coe¢cients of the Probit regression are
the same in the Örst 3, the middle 4 and the last 3 rounds. For this reason, we use the conditional
expected value of V A over the total number of rounds in the above regression.
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not statistically signiÖcant.
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Table G.5. Robustness checks for market B
The table shows the regression results of the Önal price of asset A on C and V A, dummy variables
for the middle 4 rounds (M) and the last 3 rounds (L) and their interactions with C and V A, in
columns 1 and 3. Columns 2 and 4 show the regression results using the conditional expectation
of V A (computed by the probit regression) and its interactions with M and L. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the session level. *, **, *** denote signiÖcance at the 10, 5, 1
percent level, respectively.
Initial price (Örst 5 trades) Final price (last 5 trades)
C 0.104 0.042 0.288 0.219
(0.117) (0.136) (0.149) (0.178)
C !M -0.034 0.043 -0.130 0.013
(0.160) (0.161) (0.216) (0.224)
C ! L 0.162 0.186 0.011 0.023
(0.090) (0.180) (0.144) (0.236)
V A 0.122 0.207
(0.127) (0.164)
V A !M 0.047 0.185
(0.165) (0.195)
V A ! L 0.094 0.088
(0.147) (0.161)
Eprobit(V AjpLast5A ) 0.597** 0.747**
(0.181) (0.120)
Eprobit(V AjpLast5A ) !M -0.283 -0.232
(0.229) (0.239)
Eprobit(V AjpLast5A ) ! L -0.194 -0.120
(0.223) (0.187)
M -8.953 12.535 -14.986 7.303
(24.049) (24.092) (20.683) (10.536)
L -25.078 -0.661 -19.516 2.488
(22.775) (16.889) (27.503) (15.510)
Constant 46.111* 14.501 27.513 -8.808
(22.369) (18.852) (23.053) (11.687)
H0 : (2 = (3, p-value 0.288 0.462
H0 : )2 = )3, p-value 0.465 0.954
H0 : (5 = (6, p-value 0.791 0.708
H0 : )5 = )6, p-value 0.694 0.701
N 60 60 60 60
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Appendix H: Instructions
Instructions for the Experiment: Phase I
Welcome to our experiment! You are about to take part in a study on decision
making with 15 other participants. The experiment consists of two phases. You
will now read the instructions for Phase I and participate in it. For Phase II you
will later receive additional instructions.
Everyone has the same instructions. Whenever you have questions, please, do
not hesitate to ask one of the supervisors for clariÖcation. Please, do not ask your
questions loudly or try to communicate with other participants.
Before the experiment starts, we will randomly assign each of you to one of
two groups: half of you (8 participants) will belong to group I, and the other half
to group II. You belong to the same group throughout the entire experiment (your
group will be shown on the computer screen).
The Experiment
The Örst phase of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. In every round, par-
ticipants in each group have the opportunity to trade a good among themselves.
Trading lasts for 200 seconds. Participants in each group only observe the decisions
made in their group and can only trade among themselves.
The value of the good is expressed in a Öctitious currency called ìlira,î which
will be converted into British Pounds at the end of the experiment according to
the following exchange rate:
100 liras = $1.
The value of the good
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At the beginning of every round, the value of the good will be determined by
the computer with a mechanism simulating the tossing of a fair coin. The good
can have value 0 or 100 liras depending on whether the coin lands heads or tails.
Like in the toss of a fair coin, the chances of the good having value 0 or 100 are
equal. Note that for each group the computer simulates the tossing of a fair coin
at the beginning of every round. Thus, in each round the value of the good is the
same for all participants in the same group. The value of the good can, however,
change from round to round. And whether the value in a round is 0 or 100 does
not depend on the value in previous rounds.
The information you will receive
All participants will receive some information about the value of the good.
How is this information given?
Suppose the value of the good in one group is 100 liras. In this case, we will
use a random device similar to an urn with 8 coloured balls: 6 balls are green and 2
are red. Each of the 8 participants will receive one of these balls. Therefore, there
is a chance of 3=4 (equal to 6=8) that you will observe the message ìThe colour of
the ball is GREENî on your computer screen; and there is a chance of 1=4 (equal
to 2=8) that you will observe the message ìThe colour of the ball is REDî.
Suppose, instead, that the value of the good is 0 liras. In this case, we will use
a random device similar to an urn with 8 coloured balls: 6 balls are red and 2 are
green. Each of the 8 participants will receive one of these balls. Therefore, there
is a chance of 3=4 (equal to 6=8) that you will observe the message ìThe colour of
the ball is REDî on your computer screen; and there is a chance of 1=4 (equal to
2=8) that you will observe the message ìThe colour of the ball is GREENî.
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To recap:
! If the value is 100, then there are more GREEN balls in the box.
! If the value is 0, then there are more RED balls in the box.
Therefore, the colour of the ball will give you some information about the value
of the good.
When is the information given?
Every participant receives his/her information at the beginning of the 200
seconds.
Procedure for each round
The sequence of activities in each round will be the following:
1. Participants receive information on the value of the good in their group.
2. Participants trade the good for 200 seconds.
3. At the end of the 200 seconds, all participants receive information on the
outcomes of their trading activity. In particular, everyone observes the true
value of the good and will be able to compute his/her own payo§ according
to the rules indicated below.
After the Örst round is concluded, we start the second round of the experiment.
The procedures are identical to those of the Örst round.
Trading
In Figure 1 you see a screen-shot of the trading platform on your computer. In
the upper part of the screen, there are two boxes showing the existing Buy O§ers
and Sell O§ers. In the lower part, there are buttons that you can use to buy or
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sell, and a box where you can insert the price at which you are willing to buy or
sell.
On the top left-hand side you can see your holdings of cash and units of the
asset (i.e., your Portfolio). On the bottom, you see a continuously updated history
of the prices at which the good is traded.
Initial Endowment
At the beginning of each round, you receive an endowment of 4 units of the
good and 500 liras. You can use your endowment to trade during the round. The
box ìPortfolioî is updated whenever you buy or sell a unit of the good. When
you buy one unit of the good, the number of units of the good in your portfolio
increases by one, and the amount of liras decreases by the price you have paid.
When you sell one unit, the number of units of the good in your portfolio decreases
by one, and the amount of liras increases by the price at which you have sold.
How to sell or buy
Buying and selling is very simple. If you want to sell one unit of the good,
you simply click on the button SELL and enter the minimum amount of liras you
want to obtain. Your o§er appears immediately in the column Sell O§ers where all
open sell o§ers are collected. The open sell o§ers are ordered with the lowest price
being on the top of the list. You can easily identify your own sell o§ers because
they are marked with a button that gives you the opportunity to cancel them, if
you so wish.
Similarly, if you want to buy one unit of the good, click on the button BUY
and enter the maximum amount of liras you are willing to pay. Your o§er appears
immediately in the column Buy O§ers, where all open buy o§ers are collected.
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The open buy o§ers are ordered with the highest price being on the top of the
list. You can easily identify your open buy o§ers, because they are marked with a
button that gives you the opportunity to cancel them, if you so wish.
You are always allowed to withdraw your buy or sell o§er that have not been
executed: just click on Cancel on the order you want to withdraw.
When and how does a trade take place? A trade is possible if the lowest
Sell Price is lower than the highest Buy Price. In this situation, one participant
is willing to pay more for the good than another participant asks for it. This
situation is recognized by the system and trading takes place automatically.
A simple example will clarify this. Suppose that in a particular moment the
lowest Sell Price is 55 liras and the highest Buy Price is 53 liras. Then, no trade
is possible. If another participant is willing to buy at 55 liras, the only thing s/he
needs to do is enter a Buy Price of 55 liras into the system. The system recognizes
that a trade is possible and trade takes place: that is, the seller receives 55 liras
from the buyer and the buyer receives one unit of the good from the seller. Note
that the transaction always occurs at the pre-existing price. For instance, even if
a participant enters a Buy Price of 61 in the system, since the pre-existing lowest
Sell Price is 55, the transaction will occur at 55 liras. In other words, if you see a
Sell Price at which you are willing to buy, it is enough that you enter a Buy Price
equal or greater than that to buy the good.
Consider another example. Suppose that in a particular moment the highest
Buy Price is 30 liras and the lowest Sell Price is 37 liras. Then, no trade is possible.
If another participant is willing to sell at 30 liras, the only thing s/he needs to
do is enter a Sell Price of 30 liras into the system. The system recognizes that a
trade is possible and trade takes place: that is, the seller receives 30 liras from the
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buyer and the buyer receives one unit of the good from the seller. As we said, the
transaction always occurs at the pre-existing price. Therefore, even if a participant
enters a Sell Price of 23 in the system, since the pre-existing highest Buy Price is
30, the transaction will occur at 30 liras.
As we said, the list of all prices at which a transaction took place appears on
the bottom of the screen. The most recent transaction prices are on the top of
the list. Your own transactions are identiÖed so that you can keep track of your
previous decisions.
Payo§ in each round
At the end of every round, you will be told the true value of the good. Your
total per-round payo§ depends on: 1) the Önal value of your portfolio, which
depends on the value of the good and the amount of liras and the number of units
of the good that you hold at the end of the round, and 2) an extra payo§, which
depends on the number of trades (sell or buy) you have made during the round.
Value of your portfolio
The value of your portfolio is computed in the following way:
Value of portfolio = liras + (units of the good)!(value of the good)
Example 1: Suppose you end a round having 200 liras of cash and 8 units of
the good. Suppose the value of the good in that round is 100. Then the value of
your portfolio is 200 + (8) " (100) = 1000.
Suppose, instead, that the value of the good is 0. Then the value of your
portfolio is 200 + (8) " (0) = 200.
Extra payo§
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You receive an extra payment of 5 liras for the Örst 5 buy or sell trades that
you execute (i.e., up to a maximum of 25 liras in each round).
Example 1: If in one round you sell 2 goods and buy 2 goods (4 trades), you
will earn an additional payment of 4 ! 5 = 20 liras.
Example 2: If in one round you sell 6 goods and buy 1 good (7 trades), you
will earn 5 ! 5 = 25 liras, as your extra payment cannot exceed 25 liras.
Note that your extra payment will not immediately increase the amount of liras
in your portfolio (which you can use to buy more assets), but will be only part of
your Önal pay-o§.
Your total per-round payo§ will therefore be:
Total per-round payo§ = value of your portfolio + extra payo§
Payment
This Örst part of the experiment (Phase I) is meant as training for Phase II.
It gives you the opportunity to learn how to trade. Although we will compute the
payo§s as described above, they will not a§ect your Önal payment. It is, however,
important that you do your best to make proÖts also in this Örst part, since what
you learn here will be useful for Phase II, which will be paid. In Phase II,
the payo§s will be computed in the same way as described above. Those payo§s
will be relevant for your Önal payment: the more money you make by trading,
the higher your payment will be. We will convert your liras into pounds at the
exchange rate of 100 liras = $1. That is, for every 100 liras you earn in Phase
II, you will get 1 pound. Moreover, you will receive a participation fee of $5 just
for showing up on time. You will be paid in cash (in private) at the end of the
experiment.
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You will now go through a short questionnaire to make sure that you have
understood the instructions and then the experiment will start.
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Instructions for Phase II - Treatment I
Let us now move the Phase II of the experiment.
Phase II
This phase consists of 10 rounds. The rules are identical for all rounds.
As we said, you belong to the same group as in Phase I. The main di§erence
with respect to Phase I is that there are now two goods, good A and good B.
Moreover, in each round, the two goods are traded one after the other: Örst, one
group trades good A; then, after the group has Önished, the other group trades
good B. Each group trades for 200 seconds. Whenever a group is not trading,
every participant in that group can observe the trading activity of the other group.
The value of good A
As in Phase I, at the beginning of every round, the value of good A will be
determined by the computer with a mechanism simulating the tossing of a coin.
The coin can have value 0 liras or value 100 liras depending on whether it lands
heads or tails. Like in the toss of a fair coin, the chances of the coin having value
0 or 100 are equal.
The value of good B
The value of good B will be either 0 or 100 liras. In particular, it will be equal
either to the value of good A (with 50% chance), or to the value of a second coin,
the ìB-coinî (also with 50% chance).
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The value of the B-coin will also be determined by the computer at the begin-
ning of every round, by simulating the tossing of a coin. The coin can have value
0 liras or value 100 liras depending on whether it lands heads or tails. Like in the
toss of a fair coin, the chances of the coin having value 0 or 100 are equal.
In other words, suppose good A is worth 100. Then,
Value of good B = 100 with 50% chance
Value of good B = Value of B-coin with 50% chance
Suppose, instead that good A is worth 0. Then,
Value of good B = 0 with 50% chance
Value of good B = Value B-coin with 50% chance
Information you will receive
When good A is traded, all participants belonging to the group trading good
A will receive some information about the value of good A. When good B is
traded, all participants belonging to the group trading good B will receive some
information on the value of the B-coin. However, participants belonging to the
group trading good B will not know whether the value of good B is equal to that
of good A or whether it is determined by the value of the B-coin.
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How is this information given?
When you trade good A, you will receive information on the value of the good
exactly as described in Phase I. If the value is 100, you will receive a coloured
ball; 6 participants will receive a green ball, whereas only 2 will receive a red ball.
If, instead, the value is 0, 6 participants will receive a red ball, whereas only 2 will
receive a green ball.
When you trade good B, you will not receive information on the value of the
good, but on the value of the B-coin. The procedure will be the same. If the value
of the B-coin is 100 you will receive a coloured ball; 6 participants will receive
a green ball, whereas only 2 will receive a red ball. If, instead, the value of the
B-coin is 0, 6 participants will receive a red ball, whereas only 2 will receive a
green ball.
When is the information given?
As in Phase I, every participant receives his/her information before his/her
group starts trading (at the beginning of the 200 seconds).
Procedures for each round
As indicated above, the groups I and II trade in sequence. In odd rounds (1-
3-5-...), group I trades good A (for 200 seconds), and then group II trades good
B (for 200 seconds). In even rounds (2-4-6-...), group II trades good A (for 200
seconds), and then group I trades good B (for 200 seconds).
The sequence of activities in round 1 will be the following:
1. Group I participants receive information on the value of good A.
2. Group I participants trade good A for 200 seconds, while participants in
the other group (II) only observe. While observing the behavior of Group I
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participants, Group II participants will indicate, on a separate form, what
they think the chance is that the true value of good A is 100.
3. Group II participants receive information on the value of the B-coin.
4. Group II participants trade good B for 200 seconds, while participants of
the other group only observe.
5. All participants receive information on the outcomes of their trading activity.
In particular, everyone will observe the true value of good A and of good
B and will be able to compute his/her own payo§ according to the rules
indicated below.
After the Örst round is concluded, we start the second round of the experiment.
The procedures are identical to those of the Örst round, with the exception that
now group II starts and trades good A and then group I trades good B. The
experiment continues until the 10th round is completed.
Trading
The trading platform on your computer, the initial endowment, and the way
you sell or buy a good are all the same as in Phase I. The only di§erence is that
now the two groups trade di§erent goods (with possibly di§erent values) one after
the other, with one group observing the trading activity of the other.
Payment at the end of the experiment
The per-round payo§s will be determined in the same way as in Phase I. At
the end of every round, you will be told the true value of both goods A and B.
Your total per-round payo§ depends on:
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1) what you hold at the end of the round: the amount of liras plus the value
of the units of the good A or B (according to the good that you traded);
2) an extra payment of 5 liras for the Örst 5 buy or sell trades that you execute
(up to a maximum of 25 liras in each round).
We will randomly select 3 out of the 10 rounds of Phase II and we will sum
your per-round payo§s in these three rounds to determine your Önal payo§ in liras
for Phase II. We will then convert liras into pounds at the exchange rate of 100
liras = $1 and we will sum up this amount to the participation fee of $5. We will
pay you in private, immediately at the end of the experiment.
You will now go through a short questionnaire to make sure that you have
understood the instructions and then Phase II will start.
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Instructions for Phase II - Treatment II
Let us now move the Phase II of the experiment.
Phase II
This phase consists of 10 rounds. The rules are identical for all rounds.
As we said, you belong to the same group as in Phase I. The main di§erence
with respect to Phase I is that there are now two goods, good A and good B.
Moreover, in each round, the two goods are traded one after the other: Örst, one
group trades good A; then, after the group has Önished, the other group trades
good B. Each group trades for 200 seconds. Whenever a group is not trading,
every participant in that group can observe the trading activity of the other group.
The value of good A
As in Phase I, at the beginning of every round, the value of good A will be
determined by the computer with a mechanism simulating the tossing of a coin.
The coin can have value 0 liras or value 100 liras depending on whether it lands
heads or tails. Like in the toss of a fair coin, the chances of the coin having value
0 or 100 are equal.
The value of good B
At the beginning of every round, the value of good B will be determined by
the computer with a mechanism simulating the tossing of a coin. The coin can
have value 0 liras or value 100 liras depending on whether it lands heads or tails.
Like in the toss of a fair coin, the chances of the coin having value 0 or 100 are
equal. Note that the computer will use one coin (coin A) for good A and one coin
(coin B) for good B. These two coin tosses are independent, that is, the outcome
of the one coin toss does not a§ect the other.
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Information you will receive
When good A is traded, all participants belonging to the group trading good
A will receive some information about the value of good A. When good B is
traded, all participants belonging to the group trading good B will receive some
information on the value of good B.
How is this information given?
When you trade good A, you will receive information on the value of the good
exactly as described in Phase I. If the value is 100, you will receive a coloured
ball; 6 participants will receive a green ball, whereas only 2 will receive a red ball.
If, instead, the value is 0, 6 participants will receive a red ball, whereas only 2 will
receive a green ball.
When you trade good B, you will receive information on the value of good B.
The procedure will be the same. If the value of good B is 100 you will receive a
coloured ball; 6 participants will receive a green ball, whereas only 2 will receive
a red ball. If, instead, the value of good B is 0, 6 participants will receive a red
ball, whereas only 2 will receive a green ball.
When is the information given?
As in Phase I, every participant receives his/her information before his/her
group starts trading (at the beginning of the 200 seconds).
Procedures for each round
As indicated above, the groups I and II trade in sequence. In odd rounds (1-
3-5-...), group I trades good A (for 200 seconds), and then group II trades good
B (for 200 seconds). In even rounds (2-4-6-...), group II trades good A (for 200
seconds), and then group I trades good B (for 200 seconds).
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The sequence of activities in round 1 will be the following:
1. Group I participants receive information on the value of good A.
2. Group I participants trade good A for 200 seconds, while participants in
the other group (II) only observe. While observing the behavior of Group I
participants, Group II participants will indicate, on a separate form, what
they think the chance is that the true value of good A is 100.
3. Group II participants receive information on the value of good B.
4. Group II participants trade good B for 200 seconds, while participants of
the other group only observe.
5. All participants receive information on the outcomes of their trading activity.
In particular, everyone will observe the true value of good A and of good
B and will be able to compute his/her own payo§ according to the rules
indicated below.
After the Örst round is concluded, we start the second round of the experiment.
The procedures are identical to those of the Örst round, with the exception that
now group II starts and trades good A and then group I trades good B. The
experiment continues until the 10th round is completed.
Trading
The trading platform on your computer, the initial endowment, and the way
you sell or buy a good are all the same as in Phase I. The only di§erence is that
now the two groups trade di§erent goods (with possibly di§erent values) one after
the other, with one group observing the trading activity of the other.
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Payment at the end of the experiment
The per-round payo§s will be determined in the same way as in Phase I. At
the end of every round, you will be told the true value of both goods A and B.
Your total per-round payo§ depends on:
1) what you hold at the end of the round: the amount of liras plus the value
of the units of the good A or B (according to the good that you traded);
2) an extra payment of 5 liras for the Örst 5 buy or sell trades that you execute
(up to a maximum of 25 liras in each round).
We will randomly select 3 out of the 10 rounds of Phase II and we will sum
your per-round payo§s in these three rounds to determine your Önal payo§ in liras
for Phase II. We will then convert liras into pounds at the exchange rate of 100
liras = $1 and we will sum up this amount to the participation fee of $5. We will
pay you in private, immediately at the end of the experiment.
You will now go through a short questionnaire to make sure that you have
understood the instructions and then Phase II will start.
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Figure H1. Trading Platform
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